04 Jun Ecuador: Restoring the Strategic Link. The Noboa Administration and the Reinvigoration of Bilateral Defense Cooperation with the United States
By,
Jaime (Jimmy) González, Senior Fellow | MSI2
The victory of President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador this year is of profound significance, particularly in the context of the country’s strategic defense alignment with the United States.
Following the invocation of the muerte cruzada constitutional mechanism and the dissolution of the National Assembly by then-President Guillermo Lasso, Noboa emerged as the winner of a snap election in 2023. Faced with a surge in violence driven by transnational narcotics trafficking, Noboa has embarked on a series of bold measures to bolster Ecuador’s internal security. Many of these measures hinge on the expansion of bilateral and regional cooperation with the United States. His administration’s overtures mark a departure from the sovereignty-centric approach of past leaders, notably Rafael Correa, and reflect a pragmatic embrace of external partnerships to counter the mounting threat posed by criminal networks. President Noboa’s strategic foresight is evident in his initiatives, instilling confidence in his leadership among the Ecuadorian people and the international community.
Following his swearing-in for a second term last week, President Noboa is likely to continue bolstering his defense relations with the United States, a trend established by his predecessor. He continues to signal intentions toward strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, particularly in addressing regional security concerns such as narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and transnational threats originating from neighboring countries like Colombia and Peru. Historically, Ecuador’s defense policy has fluctuated between distancing itself from U.S. military cooperation, notably during the leftist-leaning Rafael Correa administration, and subsequent re-engagement under Presidents Lenín Moreno and Guillermo Lasso.
My aim is to demonstrate how Noboa’s security agenda is shaping bilateral cooperation in regional security and counter-narcotics policy. This analysis situates his administration within the historical trajectory of Ecuador, examining key developments under his leadership and evaluating the opportunities and potential risks of closer military and intelligence cooperation with the United States. These risks, which include potential backlash from domestic political factions, concerns about the erosion of civilian oversight, and the dangers of outsourcing national security to private entities, underscore the complexity of the situation.
Noboa’s Doctrine? Reimagining US–Ecuador Defense Relations Through Strategic and Counternarcotics Lenses
Noboa’s election is a continuation and intensification of the strategic realignment initiated by his predecessor, Guillermo Lasso, characterized by renewed openness toward American military assistance and training programs (O’Neil & Trinkunas, 2023). Specifically, Ecuador under Noboa seeks expanded U.S. support in maritime security, surveillance technology, and joint military exercises, which are crucial for safeguarding Ecuador’s coastal and border regions from illicit activities (U.S. Department of State, 2024). He also has shown interest in reactivating the Manta facility, a key strategic location once used by the U.S. as a counterdrug interdiction command and control center. (CNN,2025). Moreover, Noboa’s stated commitment to reinforcing democratic governance will align closely with current U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America, including countering drug trafficking organizations, reducing illegal migration, combating counterterrorism, and potentially fostering a more robust and consistent defense partnership. The potential opening of Manta to the U.S. military requires that the president negotiate internally to seek a constitutional amendment allowing troops in Ecuador. (Constitutionet, 2025 )
An Internal Conflict: Battling the Drug Trafficking Organizations and Common Criminals
President Noboa has defined Ecuador’s security crisis as an ‘internal armed conflict,’ a designation that has allowed his administration to exercise exceptional authority, such as deploying the military for domestic policing and classifying organized crime networks as terrorist organizations. This ‘internal armed conflict’ refers to the widespread violence and criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking, that have plagued the country. In response, his government has initiated a comprehensive campaign to regain control over prisons and urban areas dominated by criminal groups while also proposing the involvement of foreign security personnel to assist with intelligence and support functions.
This strategic realignment with the United States is likely to face domestic political resistance from sectors that view closer military collaboration with caution or outright opposition. This is particularly true given Ecuador’s complex history with external military influence. Luisa Gonzalez, aligned with former President Correa—a strident leftist who closed Manta and the U.S. Security Office in Quito—might lead this domestic resistance.
Noboa’s policy initiatives, however, face essential legal and political constraints. A 2023 ruling by Ecuador’s Constitutional Court requires National Assembly approval and a public referendum for deploying foreign troops or establishing military bases in Ecuador (El Universo, 2024). Although Noboa has initiated such processes, opposition lawmakers and civil society groups have raised concerns about militarizing internal security and the erosion of civilian oversight.
In March 2025, reports revealed that Noboa had entered a security consulting agreement with Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater’s private military firm, to assist in counter-narcotics operations. (Collyns, 2025). While the deal focuses on training and strategic advising, Prince’s legacy and Blackwater’s human rights record have raised alarms among domestic watchdogs and international observers, who warn of the dangers of outsourcing national security to private entities. Noboa’s administration must navigate domestic sensitivities carefully, striking a balance between national sovereignty concerns and the perceived benefits of enhanced defense cooperation with the United States.
Potential Effects of Noboa’s Administration on Ecuador’s Defense Agreements, Military Assistance, and Training Programs with the United States
Noboa is a savvy political leader who will probably significantly shape Ecuador’s existing and future defense agreements with the United States, particularly in military assistance and training programs. Given Noboa’s expressed intent to enhance security collaboration with the US, it is likely that his government will pursue expanded bilateral agreements and increased U.S. military aid (Ellis, 2024; U.S. Department of State, 2024). This enhanced defense cooperation has the potential to bolster Ecuador’s security and stability significantly, fostering optimism about the future among the Ecuadorian people and the international community.
Historically, Ecuador’s relationship with the United States in defense matters has fluctuated between collaboration and cautious disengagement. The 1999 agreement, which allowed U.S. anti-drug surveillance aircraft to operate out of the Manta Air Base, was a cornerstone of bilateral security cooperation until President Correa declined to renew the lease in 2009, citing sovereignty concerns (Isacson, 2021). In the following years, defense ties remained limited. However, cooperation in humanitarian and counternarcotics areas continued through programs administered by the State Department and U.S. Southern Command (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Conversely, the presidencies of Lenín Moreno and Guillermo Lasso saw a progressive re-engagement with U.S. defense initiatives, including the reactivation of joint training programs and limited military cooperation (Department of State, 2022; O’Neil & Trinkunas, 2023). In the preceding two years, Noboa signed a U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement, which enables increased security assistance to Ecuador and a higher number of operational engagements, emphasizing mutual interests in combating narcotics trafficking and organized crime, as well as enhancing border security. (U.S. Embassy Ecuador, 2023)
Additionally, Noboa’s administration could seek increased participation of Ecuadorian military personnel in U.S.-sponsored training programs, such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Such initiatives foster professionalization within the armed forces, promote interoperability, and reinforce democratic governance (Crandall, 2022). This potential for increased participation in U.S.-sponsored training programs offers hope for enhancing Ecuador’s military capabilities, instilling a sense of optimism about the country’s future security.
How Might President Noboa’s Policies Influence Bilateral Cooperation in Regional Security and Counternarcotics Efforts?
The Noboa administration is poised to significantly reshape Ecuador’s bilateral cooperation with the United States in regional security and counter-narcotics operations. He has implemented a proactive security agenda designed to counter escalating violence fueled by organized crime and transnational drug trafficking networks. These policies have led to a visible deepening of security ties with the United States and regional stakeholders.
The strategic importance of Ecuador, bordering two of the world’s largest cocaine-producing nations, Colombia and Peru, has placed it at the heart of regional narcotics flows. Noboa’s policies signal a shift toward greater alignment with U.S. security priorities, focusing on interdiction, maritime surveillance, and capacity-building through security sector reform. According to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Ecuador’s willingness under Noboa to expand joint operations and permit greater interoperability could enhance long-standing U.S. efforts to curb trafficking across maritime corridors in the Eastern Pacific (U.S. Southern Command, 2025). Over the last two years, Noboa has laid out the groundwork for an in-depth relationship, almost certainly for the remainder of the administration.
On April 4, 2025, Mr. Rafael Leonardo, who is Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, and Mr. James Alverson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, held a meeting at the Pentagon with Ecuador’s Minister of Defense, Gian Carlo Loffredo Rendon, and Minister of Interior, John Reimberg. (U.S. Defense News, 2025) This initial meeting with the new U.S. administration’s defense official indicates the commitment of both countries to enhance bilateral defense and security cooperation between the two nations.
To strengthen relations between the U.S. and the Ecuadorian navies, Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/US4th Fleet, welcomed a delegation from the Ecuadorian Navy (Armada del Ecuador) to Florida for Maritime Staff Talks (MST) held on February 27–28, 2025. To bolster the airlift capacity of the Ecuadorian Air Force, in May 2024, the Ecuadorian Air Force formally added a C-130H Hercules to its Fleet during a ceremony attended by leaders from the Kentucky Air National Guard, who were present to celebrate the milestone alongside their partners from the State Partnership Program. (U.S. Southern Command, 2024).
Last September, the United States and Ecuador signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement valued at $25 million. The deal supports Ecuador’s security and justice institutions by providing technical assistance, capacity building, and essential equipment. The funding will facilitate the implementation of strategic projects over the next several years to strengthen institutional capabilities and public safety. (U.S. Embassy Quito, 2024)
Last year, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander General Laura Richardson led a high-level delegation to Quito to discuss enhanced bilateral cooperation. The visit resulted in tangible support, including a U.S. donation of over $1 million in security and emergency response equipment, as well as the formalization of new interagency dialogues to address organized crime (U.S. Southern Command, 2024). These actions underscore the US’s confidence in Noboa’s security agenda and highlight the potential for long-term cooperation on intelligence sharing and joint interdiction missions.
From Convergence to Drift: Forecasting the Gradual Decline of US–Ecuador Security Cooperation in the Noboa Era
Scenario 1 – “Slow‑Burn Erosion” (2025‑2029)
In this gradual decline scenario, domestic political resistance slowly erodes the depth of US–Ecuador security cooperation. Correa-aligned legislators, civil society groups, and segments of the media frame expanded U.S. engagement as a threat to sovereignty, eroding the bipartisan consensus that initially supported Noboa’s outreach.
Catalysts for the downturn include delays in the National Assembly’s scheduling of the constitutionally required referendum on stationing foreign troops or reopening the Manta air facility, as well as mounting criticism of human-rights vetting tied to IMET and Foreign Military Financing. Funding begins to plateau when Quito fails to meet U.S. reporting benchmarks.
The unraveling unfolds in phases: (1) 2025‑26 political friction as legislative roadblocks stymie new base‑access agreements; (2) 2027 funding stalls, freezing planned increases in assistance; and (3) 2028‑29 quiet tapering as joint exercises drop from annual to bi‑annual and SOUTHCOM reallocates limited assets elsewhere.
Early‑warning indicators include repeated slippage of referendum dates, declining Ecuadorian student quotas in IMET, and fewer Maritime Staff Talks on the SOUTHCOM calendar.
Strategically, Washington retains a skeletal intel‑sharing cell in Guayaquil, but maritime drug‑seizure rates fall. China and Spain stepped in with portable radar and maritime patrol aircraft, filling capability gaps that the United States once covered.
Scenario 2 – “Backlash & Freeze” (2025‑2027)
Reputational shocks drive an abrupt cooling. A controversial security-consulting deal with Erik Prince’s Blackwater sparks domestic outrage and international scrutiny, turning the human rights spotlight on Noboa’s counter-narcotics campaign.
Media investigations link foreign trainers to abuses during prison raids, prompting U.S. lawmakers to invoke the Leahy Law and suspend unit‑level assistance in 2025. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court responds in 2026 by halting further deployment of foreign advisers pending an inquiry.
By late 2026, the freeze hardened: Congress withheld half of FY 2027 security aid and diverted CARSI funds to other Andean partners. Meanwhile, officials canceled joint exercises and suspended DSCA casework for C‑130 spare parts.
Warning signs encompass a surge of negative press and NGO reporting on prison deaths, stalled defense articles in the DSCA pipeline, and a downward shift in Ecuador’s Trafficking in Persons ranking.
The strategic consequence is a pivot toward Israeli and Turkish vendors for ISR drones, while reduced U.S. maritime patrols enable traffickers to reroute cocaine flows through the Galápagos corridor.
Scenario 3 – “Break‑off & Realignment” (2025‑2028)
A structural rupture occurs when the nationwide referendum to permit a renewed U.S. presence at Manta is soundly defeated—58 percent vote “No.” Politically wounded, Noboa looks for alternative security partners.
During the 2026 pivot year, Quito signs a limited status‑of‑forces pact with Colombia and Chile and opens talks with Spain for a coastal radar upgrade. By 2027‑28, SOUTHCOM will shutter its Security Assistance Office in Guayaquil, and China will begin offering concessional loans for dual‑use infrastructure. The PLA Navy makes its first port call in Guayaquil.
Watch-list indicators include Ecuador joining Chile’s “Pacific Security Belt” forum instead of SOUTHCOM, a Spanish firm, INDRA, beating Raytheon for radar contracts, and a PLA logistics ship visiting Ecuadorian waters.
Strategically, the United States loses a critical foothold on Eastern Pacific trafficking routes, while the Chinese presence at Manta undercuts U.S. maritime domain awareness. Ecuador’s military doctrine is gradually aligning with a European human-security paradigm, which reduces interoperability with U.S. forces.
References
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).