12 Jun Is China preparing to take complete control of Cuban telecommunications?

By,

Dr. Rafael Marrero. Founder, Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²)

For over a decade, China has deployed a sophisticated network of equipment, systems, and platforms on the island.

Last week, thousands of young Cubans took to the streets to protest the abrupt increase in mobile internet access rates imposed by ETECSA (Cuban Telecommunications Company S.A.), the state-owned telecommunications monopoly. Although the regime justifies this decision with the argument of higher maintenance costs, everything indicates something deeper and more dangerous: the imminent transfer of Cuba’s critical telecommunications infrastructure to the People’s Republic of China.

Economic Crisis and Technical Excuse

ETECSA has stated that the increases are due to “high network maintenance costs,” a questionable justification in a country mired in its worst economic crisis in three decades. However, this narrative could serve as a technical cover to justify foreign intervention in a strategic sector. Specifically, the intervention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through its state-owned companies Huawei and ZTE, both sanctioned by the United States for espionage and intellectual property theft (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2022).

China’s scaffolding in Cuba

For over a decade, China has deployed a sophisticated network of equipment, systems, and platforms on the island. Below is a technical inventory documented by open investigations and intelligence analysis:

• Huawei/ZTE servers and platforms at ETECSA’s main nodes are used to monitor traffic and store user metadata.
• Huawei-distributed GPON (Gigabit Passive Optical Network), which allows deep access to end-user browsing history (Freedom House, 2023).
• ZTE 3G and 4G mobile base stations, operational in Havana, Santiago, Santa Clara, and restricted military zones.
• Huawei-manufactured deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment, backbone routers, and advanced firewalls, ideal for mass censorship and content control (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2022).
• Video surveillance, facial analysis, and remote monitoring systems coordinate with the “safe city” technology used by China in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Iran (Grossman et al., 2023).

This entire system not only allows for internal surveillance, but can also be used for offensive intelligence operations against the US and regional allies.

Why Cuba?

Cuba’s geographic location makes the island an ideal platform for Chinese electronic espionage. From Bejucal, one of the most active SIGINT bases, the Chinese can intercept US radar, telecommunications, and satellite signals just 90 miles from Florida. According to the Pentagon, there are already at least 12 active Chinese electronic intelligence facilities on Cuban territory (Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2024).

Furthermore, Cuba possesses significant reserves of nickel and cobalt, minerals critical to the energy transition and the production of semiconductors, batteries, and modern weapons. China seeks to control this resource as part of its strategy to dominate global supply chains (U.S. Geological Survey, 2023).

Cuba as a pilot zone for digital authoritarianism

According to experts, the island has become a laboratory for the “Chinese model of digital control.” Our think tank has described and coined the term “geopolitical espionage aircraft carrier” to describe Cuba, from which the regime has been replicating techniques of censorship, surveillance, and digital repression that Beijing has exported to allied regimes. Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua form the so-called “digital axis of Latin American authoritarianism,” all with critical infrastructure provided by Chinese companies.

This model includes:

• Constant monitoring of social media.
• Blocking of independent news sites.
• Selective service interruptions during protests.
• Surveillance of dissidents, activists, and journalists using facial recognition technologies (Freedom House, 2023).

Risks to US National Security

The presence of companies like Huawei and ZTE is neither neutral nor merely commercial. According to the FBI, both act as “extensions of Chinese military intelligence,” and their presence in Latin American telecommunications represents a direct threat (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2022).

From Cuba, these platforms could facilitate:

• Interception of US diplomatic and military communications.
• Surveillance of US contractors in the Caribbean.
• Access to logistics, port, and energy networks linked to the Southern Command.
• Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks from Cuban territory, according to defense sources (Department of Defense, 2025).

A digital “missile crisis”?

What we are witnessing today is reminiscent, in a silent version, of the 1962 missile crisis. Only now the missiles are not ballistic, but cybernetic. And the adversary is not Moscow, but Beijing. The difference is that surveillance and control systems don’t require visible launchers or mobile platforms. They are hidden in data centers, routers, submarine cables, and radio communication stations.

What should the US do?

The US government cannot continue to react slowly to this growing threat in its immediate vicinity. MSI² recommends:

1. Impose targeted sanctions on ETECSA officials and military operators linked to the deployment of Chinese technologies on the island.
2. Create a Hemispheric Cyber ​​Defense Task Force, led by CYBERCOM and with the participation of allies such as Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic.
3. Close the door to indirect external financing of ETECSA through remittances disguised as payments for digital services.
4. Demand multilateral technology audits, in collaboration with the OAS and the IDB, on critical networks in the region.

Presence confirmed and expanding

According to Pentagon sources and analyses corroborated by MSI², there are at least 12 operational or advanced-stage SIGINT locations in Cuban territory under technical assistance or direct control of the People’s Republic of China.

Among the most active bases are:

• Bejucal: Main listening station for space signals, radar, and communications, modernized with satellite triangulation technology.
• Calabazar and Wajay (Havana): Microwave logistics sites, fiber optic repeaters, and radio communication towers serving as secondary nodes.
• El Salao (Santiago de Cuba): Extended interception platform with new circular antenna arrays visible by satellite starting in 2023.
• Mariel (Artemisa): Strategic point with dual telecommunications infrastructure and key port connection.
• Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Isla de la Juventud: Maritime coverage and coastal surveillance areas with regional interception capabilities.
• Santiago de las Vegas and San Antonio de los Baños: Areas near military installations where the installation of high-frequency transmission equipment has been documented.

According to MSI2, these facilities could capture U.S. diplomatic, commercial, and military traffic, directly affecting the security of Southern Command, U.S. defense and intelligence contractor facilities, and those of regional allies.

The Wall Street Journal (June 2023) confirmed that China offered multimillion-dollar investments to the Cuban regime to ensure permanent access to these platforms, consolidating its technological and intelligence presence in the Western Hemisphere.

According to intelligence reports published by the WSJ, China offered billions in financial support in exchange for installing these spy platforms on the island (WSJ, June 2023).

ETECSA’s technological dependence

Cuban telecommunications networks are largely controlled by Huawei and ZTE:

• GPON fiber optic systems for passive surveillance
• Routers and firewalls with deep packet inspection (DPI) for content censorship
• 3G/4G base stations deployed in key cities and military zones
• Facial surveillance and urban monitoring systems, similar to those used by China in Venezuela and Iran

Dependence on the Digital Silk Road and Strategic Debt

• Cuba signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with China in 2018 and 2021 to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Beijing forgave more than $6 billion of Cuban debt in 2011 and restructured subsequent payments in 2015 and 2023, making new investments in telecommunications, energy, and logistics conditional.
• According to the US Department of Defense’s 2024 report, the so-called Digital Silk Road includes investments in 5G/6G towers, submarine cables, data centers, and command and control networks with potential military uses.

Military-Civil Fusion and Cyberwarfare

• The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has reorganized its cyber operations under a new Information Support Force (ISF), tasked with ensuring digital operations abroad.
• China’s strategic objectives for 2027 include dominance in “intelligentized warfare” and electromagnetic supremacy.
• The Digital Silk Road seeks to export mass surveillance and repression technologies powered by artificial intelligence, replicating the Chinese authoritarian model in vulnerable countries.

UCI: Cuba’s Cyber ​​Brain

• The University of Computer Sciences (UCI) in Havana trains cyberwarfare teams with Chinese methodological support.
• These teams, known as “Red Teams,” operate with cyber tactics similar to those of the EPL, engaging in:

• Digital surveillance of opponents
• Manipulation of social media
• Theft of intellectual property through Chinese platforms

Strategic Conclusion for the US

Just 90 miles off the coast of Florida, the technological infrastructure installed by China in Cuba poses a direct risk to the US:

• Interception of diplomatic and military communications
• Cyber ​​intrusion into Southern Command systems and regional logistics networks
• Interoperability of Chinese equipment in Cuba with Huawei and ZTE telecommunications equipment present on communications towers, nodes, and antennas near US military bases, which has not yet been removed and replaced, despite a federal mandate (“Rip and replace”).
• Potential for electromagnetic or denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from Cuban soil

Diagnosis: Cuba is no longer a sovereign actor in the digital realm. Today, it is a Chinese satellite platform, a “spy aircraft carrier” serving its hybrid warfare strategy against the democratic interests of the hemisphere.

Conclusion

The “maintenance costs” narrative with which ETECSA attempts to justify its abusive rates hides a more disturbing truth: the Castro regime is paving the way for China to assume operational control of Cuban telecommunications.

If this digital transfer goes ahead, the United States would not only lose access to a key strategic flank in the Caribbean but would also allow its main geopolitical adversary to operate freely from its backyard. This is no longer the time for warnings. It’s time to act.

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References

Department of Defense. (2025). Annual report on the military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2022). Counterintelligence threat overview. https://www.fbi.gov

Freedom House. (2023). Freedom on the Net: Digital authoritarianism. https://freedomhouse.org

Grossman, D., Polyakova, A., & Feldstein, S. (2023). Exporting digital authoritarianism: China’s surveillance and censorship expansion abroad. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/research/exporting-digital-authoritarianism 

Le Monde Diplomatique. (2022). Huawei, l’empire du signal. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024). Foreign threats to the United States. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. (2022). Entity list additions: Huawei, ZTE. https://www.bis.doc.gov

U.S. Geological Survey. (2023). Mineral commodity summaries: Nickel. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-nickel.pdf 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).