The Infinite War in Venezuela: Hybrid Strategies and the Conflict with the Cartel de los Soles
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14 Nov The Infinite War in Venezuela: Hybrid Strategies and the Conflict with the Cartel de los Soles

Posted at 01:46h in Analysis, English, SITREPs, Top3 by

By,

Maibort Petit, Senior Fellow, MSI²

The concept of infinite war holds that contemporary conflicts do not seek a decisive victory, but rather the constant projection of power and the long-term management of multiple threats. This article analyzes the escalation of tensions between the United States and Venezuela in the context of operations against the Cartel de los Soles, the Tren de Aragua, and strategic allies such as the ELN. It examines the phases of the war’s periodization, U.S. operations in the Caribbean, and the Venezuelan response through Operation Independence 200, evaluating the conflict from the perspective of infinite war and its political, military, and strategic implications for hemispheric security.

Introduction

In the context of contemporary international relations, infinite war (Strachan, 2011; Gray, 2005) describes conflicts characterized by indefinite duration, strategic complexity, and the multiplicity of state and non-state actors. According to Spencer (2015), modern conflicts involve complex interactions between states and criminal or insurgent actors, which requires an understanding of military operations beyond the conventional logic of victory or defeat.
The U.S. operation against the Cartel de los Soles and the Tren de Aragua, as well as the neutralization of ELN vessels in the Caribbean, represents a paradigmatic case of this approach: the action does not seek a rapid victory but rather to alter the adversary’s operational and financial capacity, maintaining constant pressure to weaken its territorial control and illicit networks. This article analyzes the conflict from the academic perspective of infinite war, integrating contemporary military theory, hemispheric security studies, and hybrid warfare analysis.

Theoretical Framework: Infinite and Hybrid War

Strachan (2011) defines infinite war as a conflict without decisive resolution, where the primary objective is to keep the adversary in a constant state of vulnerability and adaptation. Key characteristics include:

  1. Indefinite duration: operations do not seek to totally defeat the enemy but to degrade its capacity in a sustained manner. Since August 14, 2025, when the U.S. Department of Defense ordered the deployment of air and naval forces to the southern Caribbean Sea (France 24, August 2025), a pressure campaign began that has intensified with each new announcement of military and political actions. In this contest, the government of the United States under the administration of Donald Trump initiated a new offensive policy against drug cartels and other criminal groups previously declared as Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations (SDGT) (Federal Register, February 2025; Department of the Treasury, August 2025), with the goal of disrupting them financially and operationally. In March, Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 (NTN 24, March 2025) to act swiftly against suspected members of the Tren de Aragua on U.S. soil, while blaming Nicolás Maduro for designing the invasion of the United States by these criminals. This progressive action strategy contemplates the intervention of the CIA (DW News, October 2025) and a ground incursion (El Nacional, September 2025).
  2. Multilevel: it involves state actors (the U.S. government); insurgents (the ELN); and criminal groups (the Cartel de los Soles and the Tren de Aragua), in different layers of conflict.
  3. Adaptability: flexible strategies that respond to tactical, logistical, and geopolitical changes. The development of events—as well as the cartels’ responses—sets the pace to follow, although there is a clear objective of combat and elimination of criminal groups and their leaders.
  4. Use of non-military resources: part of this doctrine includes covert operations, such as those allegedly carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Venezuelan soil; economic pressure translated into the blocking of financing mechanisms for the Maduro regime and its operators, the Cartel de los Soles and the Tren de Aragua; sanctions have been a sustained policy of U.S. governments since 2008, when the Department of the Treasury designated Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, Henry Rangel Silva, and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín for supporting the activities of the narco-terrorist organization FARC (Department of the Treasury, September 2008). In his second administration, Trump intensified them by canceling Chevron’s operating licenses in Venezuela due to noncompliance with previously established agreements (Infobae, March 2025), while imposing 25% tariffs on countries purchasing Venezuelan oil (SWI, March 2025). The control of information, applied by Nicolás Maduro’s regime through misinformation and manipulated narratives, seeks to blur the nature of U.S. counter-narcoterrorism operations against it (Petit, August 2025).

David Spencer (2015) emphasizes that contemporary conflicts are continuous, adaptive, and decentralized, in which states must combine conventional measures with indirect and non-linear actions to preserve their influence. Infinite war overlaps with hybrid war, defined by the combination of conventional, irregular, and cyber means to generate a multiplying effect on the adversary’s vulnerability (Murray & Mansoor, 2012).

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Application to Venezuela

The regime of Nicolás Maduro and U.S. operations can be analyzed within this framework, where:

  • The United States applies continuous pressure through kinetic operations, financial sanctions, and intelligence strategies.
  • Maduro and the FANB employ territorial defense, civil-military fusion, and strategic mobilization exercises, without seeking a direct decisive confrontation.
  • The Cartel de los Soles and the ELN operate as hybrid non-state actors that sustain the regime’s capacity through drug trafficking and territorial control.

As Spencer (2015) indicates, cooperation between state actors and non-state groups creates resilient power structures that prolong conflicts and make conventional military or political resolution difficult.

Military and Political Context

Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua

The Cartel de los Soles constitutes a narco-state within the Venezuelan state, controlling ports, airstrips, and borders, with multimillion-dollar revenues derived from cocaine, illegal gold, and other illicit resources. Its diffuse structure, composed of high-ranking Chavista military and political figures, allows it to operate with impunity and maintain the regime’s financial sustainability. It is an organism not organized by hierarchies, but rather by convenience and networks surrounding the drug trade, corruption, and fundamentally by loyalties more than by the skills or capacities of its members (InSight Crime, 2025).

The Tren de Aragua, as an armed branch, secures internal routes and controls strategic territories, operating in a complementary manner to the Cartel. According to Spencer (2015), these organizations demonstrate how non-state actors can perform state functions, reinforcing the logic of a prolonged and adaptive conflict. And although some attempt to deny geocriminality—the use of criminals by dictatorial and authoritarian regimes—the 2024 assassination of former Venezuelan military officer Ronald Ojeda in Chile is a clear example. The Chilean prosecutor’s office identified the Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, Diosdado Cabello—second-in-command of the Cartel de los Soles—as the intellectual author of the crime (Castro, October 2025).

ELN: Strategic Ally

The ELN, with approximately 5,000 combatants, protects cocaine routes from Colombia into Venezuela and the Caribbean, collecting “taxes” and securing strategic corridors. Its alliance with the Cartel de los Soles constitutes a critical operational axis for the regime, creating a system of hybrid and adaptive resilience. The ELN-Cartel cooperation reflects the integration of non-state actors into territorial defense and the projection of criminal economic power, a central component in the theory of infinite war (Spencer, 2015).

An international report leaked to the press explains the functioning of the criminal alliance between the ELN and the Cartel de los Soles with the objective of providing refuge for terrorists, corridors for drug trafficking, illegal mineral extraction activities, and illicit military operations along the Colombia–Venezuela border—particularly in the Catatumbo region—as well as in Zulia, Apure, and Táchira. This combination is described as hybrid, merging insurgency, organized crime, and state protection (García, August 2025).

Periodization of the War and the Logic of Infinite War

The Venezuelan regime activated Operation Independence 200 and the Great Llanos Corridor, in line with a war periodization that aligns with the logic of infinite war:

  1. Crisis period: threat assessment, increased operational readiness of the FANB, transition toward total war, and strategic deployment (Maduro, 2025).
  2. First period of the war: armed subversion and harassment, with two stages:
    • Stage 1: limited invasion by foreign military forces lasting seven days.
    • Stage 2: direct U.S. intervention lasting three months.
  3. Second period of the war: occupation and pacification, where prolonged and adaptive resistance actions are expected.

Systematic attrition and military blockades are ongoing tactics that reflect the essence of infinite war: sustained pressure without final resolution, keeping the adversary in a constant state of adaptation (Spencer, 2015). These phases allow the Venezuelan regime to project territorial power and social control even in the presence of high-intensity foreign operations.

The strategy of the Venezuelan regime aims at the long term, as recognized by Chavista actors, who claim that in response to the U.S. strategy—which they define as blitzkrieg—they must implement a resistance war with quick-decision combat—hit-and-run tactics—that, over time, wear down U.S. military power (Rivero, October 2025).

U.S. Operations in the Caribbean

The October 17, 2025, attack on an ELN vessel in international waters is part of an infinite war strategy:

  • Tactical objective: neutralize critical drug trafficking routes to the United States.
  • Strategic impact: reduce maritime cocaine flow to the U.S. by 40%, increase logistical costs, and apply financial pressure on the regime (Reuters, 2025).
  • Hybrid dimension: combination of direct military force, information control, and financial sanctions.

The U.S. deployment includes destroyers, B-52 bombers, nuclear submarines, and 10,000 troops, representing sustained pressure without immediate territorial conquest intent—consistent with Spencer’s principles of adaptive and decentralized warfare. This strategy also includes the use of advanced intelligence and coordination with regional allies, demonstrating an understanding of infinite war that integrates multiple domains: maritime, aerial, terrestrial, and financial.

Venezuelan Response: Independence 200 and Hybrid Defense

The Venezuelan response was structured under Operation Independence 200, designed to counter the U.S. deployment through:

  1. Territorial and civil-military mobilization: more than 6.2 million citizens integrated into the Bolivarian Militia participate in exercises coordinated with the FANB, reinforcing territorial defense and projecting social resilience (Maduro, 2025).
  2. Strengthening of the Comprehensive Defense Operational Zones (ZODI): plains and border states such as Barinas, Portuguesa, Cojedes, and Guárico were included in a strategic deployment scheme involving combined operations between the armed forces, police, and militias.
  3. Preparation for guerrilla warfare: in accordance with the theory of infinite war, the regime emphasizes prolonged and decentralized resistance, capable of operating even under partial occupation or sustained blockades (Spencer, 2015).

These actions reflect a hybrid model of national defense, in which the population and state and non-state actors collaborate to maintain continuity of power and resistance in the face of external threats, characterizing a prolonged and adaptive conflict. The possibility of defeating U.S. military and technological power requires a strategy of irregular, continuous warfare, consisting of multiple rapid-action offensive operations led by guerrilla forces (Rivero, October 2025).

Regional Cooperation and Binational Risks

The proposal for intelligence exchange between Colombia and Venezuela represents a double-edged dynamic. On one hand, it could strengthen the identification of drug trafficking routes and armed group operations. On the other, there is a risk of leakage of sensitive information to non-state actors such as the ELN or FARC dissidents (Trejos, 2025; Arévalo, 2025).

Criticism from security and international relations experts emphasizes above all the warning regarding Maduro’s alliance with the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia, which operate with the regime’s consent on Venezuelan territory. “Sensitive information cannot be allowed to fall into their hands” (Saavedra, October 2025).

Spencer (2015) warns that in prolonged conflicts, binational cooperation requires strict control mechanisms, since any leak can prolong the conflict and strengthen the adversary instead of neutralizing it.

Strategic Implications

For the United States

  1. Financial pressure on the Cartel de los Soles and Maduro: reduction of illicit revenues and disruption of logistical routes (Reuters, 2025).
  2. Reduction of drug flow to the U.S.: maritime and aerial interdiction strategies that impact regional narcotrafficking.
  3. Demonstration of military capacity and reach: maintains geopolitical influence in the Caribbean and Latin America without directly committing to prolonged occupations.

For Venezuela

  1. Hybrid mobilization and territorial defense: the civil-military-police fusion strengthens the regime’s resilience against external pressure.
  2. Prolonged and adaptive warfare: in line with the concept of infinite war, resistance does not seek immediate victory but rather the prolongation of political and territorial survival.
  3. Risk of internal fractures: sustained pressure may lead to desertions or internal conflicts within the FANB or sectors of the Cartel de los Soles.

For the Region

  1. Binational escalation: the Colombia–Venezuela border is a critical point of interaction between state and non-state actors.
  2. Risk of mass migration and destabilization: pressure on narcotrafficking networks and territories controlled by armed groups could generate displacement.
  3. Influence of extra-regional actors: Russia, Iran, and other Maduro allies could intervene indirectly, increasing the conflict’s complexity.

Conclusion

The conflict between the United States and Venezuela—focused on neutralizing the Cartel de los Soles, the Tren de Aragua, and strategic allies such as the ELN—exemplifies a case of contemporary infinite and hybrid war. The sustained U.S. pressure, combined with the Venezuelan regime’s tactics of resistance, mobilization, and territorial defense, reflects the indefinite prolongation of conflict, tactical adaptability, and the integration of state and non-state actors into power strategies.

As Spencer (2015) asserts, in such conflicts, conventional military victory is secondary to the strategic objective of maintaining resilience, influence, and operational capacity among the involved actors. Venezuela, through Operation Independence 200, demonstrates a hybrid model of national defense that combines social, military, and territorial resistance, while the U.S. applies kinetic, financial, and intelligence pressure to systematically degrade the regime’s and its criminal allies’ capacities.

Infinite war, therefore, provides an effective conceptual framework for understanding the complexity of the Venezuelan conflict, the adaptive nature of the tactics employed, and the regional risks arising from a prolonged, multilevel confrontation in which partial victories occur without resolving the underlying structure of the conflict.

References

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).

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