02 Jan Opinion – Menem and Milei in Relation to the United States, More Differences Than Similarities
By,
Fabián Calle, Senior Fellow, MSI²
Over the past two years, comparisons between the governments of Carlos Menem and Javier Milei regarding their relationship with the United States have been used both in serious analyses and in political debates and clichés. At first glance, both share a pro-Western stance and a favorable view of capitalism, in addition to the presence of Menem’s relatives in key positions during Milei’s administration. However, the differences are marked and central.
The first and fundamental difference lies in the contrast between the unipolarity led by the U.S. from 1989 through well into the first decade and a half of the 21st century, which subsequently gave way to a bipolar structure between the United States and China. This hegemonic dispute will accompany us in the decades to come, with a global impact and especially strong repercussions in the Asia-Pacific region. Added to this is the progressive increase in economic and trade compatibility between Argentina and the U.S. superpower.
In recent years, strategic resources such as gas, oil, and lithium have gained increasing importance, gradually joined by copper, gold, and uranium mining, as well as the use of Patagonia’s cold zones for the installation of artificial intelligence production centers. Attention should also be paid to the radical increase in the importance of the South Atlantic and the strategic Drake Passage in the open and clear contest between Washington and Beijing for control of the seas; that is, control of globalization.
It must always be borne in mind that 95 percent of world trade moves by sea and 90 percent of data transmission occurs through submarine cables.
During the period of American unipolarity, no one was in a position to challenge the power that emerged victorious from the Cold War against the Soviets. But in recent years, the Chinese regime has surpassed the Pentagon in the number of naval units for military use. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy maintains a clear advantage in total tonnage and has 11 nuclear aircraft carriers compared to none for China.
Focusing on the domestic sphere, the affinity in rhetoric and popular conservative aesthetics between Milei and Trump appears clearly greater than that which existed between George H. W. Bush and, even more so, Clinton.
Another significant variable is the fatigue that more than two decades of Kirchnerist anti-U.S. and anti-capitalist discourse have generated among broad sectors of Argentine society. Kirchnerism’s silence regarding events in Venezuela and the defeats of the left in Chile and Bolivia is a clear example of this.
Brazil’s international stance is another factor to consider. That country maintained close and pragmatic relations with the United States during the successive governments of Collor, Cardoso, and Lula’s first two terms. This dynamic is clearly no longer the same in his third term, which represents a variable to be leveraged by Milei’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Washington.
After this brief and surely incomplete analysis, there is no doubt that the clearest point of differentiation is Washington’s current stance: the use of clear policies of rewards and punishments (carrots and sticks). Firm and decisive support for Milei in the months leading up to the October 2025 legislative elections, through a favorable IMF agreement in April, a subsequent USD 20 billion swap, and an intervention of USD 2.1 billion to strengthen the Argentine peso, makes this evident.
Throughout its history, the U.S. Treasury Department has intervened only three times: twice to support the euro and once to support the yen. The revocation of visas for eight judges of Brazil’s Supreme Court, allied with Lula, and the pressure to moderate judicial political harassment against the Brazilian right stand as an intermediate case.
Undoubtedly, competition with China has led to this change from the neglect and disinterest of the past. No one doubts the excellent chemistry between Menem and George H. W. Bush, and later with Clinton, despite which economic support was very limited, with only minor assistance during the 1995 tequila crisis. Menem himself either did not want to or was unable to advance Washington’s demands regarding the hemispheric free trade area, as well as the medicinal patent law.
It is also worth recalling that Menem promoted Mercosur and economic ties with Brazil, which were not necessarily in the interest of the United States.
Currently, Milei has been negotiating a broad trade agreement with the superpower, in addition to his decision to comply with medicinal patents and his open criticism of what Mercosur has become in general and of Lula’s foreign policy in particular.
In conclusion, the Argentina–U.S. relationship in the present and foreseeable future appears oriented toward having far more substance and content than that seen in the 1990s.
In other words, this alignment with Washington comes with much more substantial counterparts than those seen in the past, as well as with significantly greater interest and duration. It is worth recalling that, at the end of 2001, the newly inaugurated administration of George W. Bush did not lift a finger to help prevent Argentina’s political and economic collapse. Whether through carrots or sticks, Washington appears set on seeking to recover and consolidate its power in the region. Beyond Trump’s characteristic verbal pyrotechnics, everything indicates that this will continue well beyond political and ideological changes in the White House in the decades to come.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).