18 Mar China’s Military Projection Worldwide is a tale of dual-function facilities—and why are there so many in South America?
By,
LTC (US Army, Ret.) Octavio Pérez— Senior Fellow, Politico-Military Affairs, MSI2
We often consider military strength to be calculated merely by a country’s Armed Forces strength: the number of personnel, equipment, and weapons systems. But we omit combat multipliers that either enhance or cover voids, which can be as effective as having an actual presence in a theater of operations.
Often, what seems to be an economic or trade mission or contract implicitly has a dual function. There are two major players in Port administration worldwide: COP (China Overseas Port), which has 115 active operational ports worldwide, and the DP (Dubai Port Authority), which manages 78 marine and inland terminals in 40 countries and six continents.
In the case of China, 14 of the 115 active ports with majority ownership have potential for naval use. In Latin America, they control access to the Panama Canal and have just completed the port of El Chancay in Perú, which will become a major hub with a draft of 17.8 meters. China has administrative and investment in over 40 ports in Latin America.
They conduct almost 95% of their total international trade through maritime sea lanes and have seventy bilateral and regional shipping agreements with 66 countries. Needless to say, they have yet to have a Blue Water Navy, which would make them a global naval power. They already have two aircraft carriers and a third on sea trials. So, considering that they have full ownership (14) ports that could be used for military purposes worldwide. And yes, these ports are built with the required berthing sizes: draft (minimum depth a boat can go w/o hitting the bottom of the hull and Quay (modified river coastline) that permit ships to dock parallel to the shore. Consider that if you already have a port with a 16-meter draft (52ft) to accommodate oil tankers, you can accommodate aircraft carriers, which need an 11-meter draft, and all other smaller vessels.
Regardless of whether they ever use them as a port to project forces, they are operational in 66 countries, managing the bulk of trade and controlling the supply chain of global trade. They can create artificial shortages, hold up supplies, and control demands, sometimes generating shortages and artificial price hikes. The dependence on Chinese maritime container ships should be a worldly concern. Port leases tend to be for long periods in most countries, given that the investment would require a return for the construction and operations, so this is a legal concern. In the future, war will not be fought on a battlefield but in all aspects of the economy, which will be a factor.
China’s endeavors in space are also a significant concern in a future confrontation. One of the priorities is to catch up on LEO (Low Orbit Satellite) technology. Its goal is to compete with Starlink, the pioneer in this realm. Qiafan hopes to build its fleet to 600 (LEO) satellites and eventually have up to 14,000 in orbit. But they are not alone; the Guowang project (owned by CSNG) China Satellite Network Group plans to have another 13,000, only with these two projects, China will have 27,000 (LEO) satellites before the end of this decade, which they are looking to have 40,000 in total. China has landed a space probe on the far side of the moon, its south pole, and expects to send a crew by 2030 (just 5 years away) and have a lunar base by 2035. So, space will be a factor again with dual use, regardless of what existing agreements say about militarizing space.
Latin America provides them with a facility that would control Geosynchronous satellites, their GPS equivalent system, EW, and missile telemetry. Back to the LEO, keeping up with them is challenging since they move so fast (17,000 mph) and only have brief contact with ground station transmitters. So, this will be a new layer of space in which many will be competing, given its recent military success (Starlink) in Ukraine.
China has been doing its homework and has seen how providing this support to the troops has enabled (Ukraine) to operate drones on the battlefield as well as at sea. If you believe in after-action reports and lessons learned and incorporate these into your battle plans, you again obtain another force multiplier, which, in the case of a conflict with Taiwan, it would be crucial to deploy systems that would provide continuous support on the battlefield.
A service provider would gain access to that market by taking this a step higher and knowing that more than 2.6 billion people worldwide have no internet connection. Latin America has large extensions of rural populations in the Matto Grosso in Brazil, the Pampas in Argentina, the altiplano deserts in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and the swamps of El Chaco Paraguay. This would be crucial for another one of China’s signature projects: The DSR (Digital Silk Road) initiative. This would integrate networks from more than 37 countries, allowing them to use high-power surveillance equipment.
And again, sharing technology for influence. In the wrong hands, they could facilitate digital censorship, empowering authoritarian regimes to take advantage of this control. It could help governments spy on their domestic opponents and rivals. Finally, inundating the market with cheap, government-supported funding items can cause even democratic countries to opt for the most affordable platforms, opening themselves to intrusion, surveillance, and control and enabling proxies like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua to continue to suppress their Opponents.
The last topic to review in this dual-use facility story concerns satellite tracking stations overseas. China has satellite tracking stations overseas in countries like Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru, allowing them to track and communicate with their satellites, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, raising concerns about potential surveillance of other countries’ assets, a notable site is the “Espacio Lejano” station in Argentina which has been subject to controversy due to its lack of oversight. It also has stations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Arctic Circle: Kenya, Namibia, Pakistan, and Sweden.
The base at Espacio Lejano Argentina can serve as a data downlink or signal retransmission using three frequency modes (S-band, X Band, and KA Band). The S-Band is used in GPS Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and civil space missions (used by NASA) deep space operations. It is also used for high-resolution mapping in dual military mode. It serves as EW (Early Warning). The X Band is used for high-resolution mapping, radio astronomy, deep space, and Earth explorations. Its dual-mode military applications include airborne intercept, battlefield surveillance (CCI), Command Control, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), missile guidance systems and weapons tracking. Finally, the Ka-Band, which is also used for high-resolution mapping in dual military mode, serves as EW (Early Warning). The Ka-Band practically mimics the X-Band in civilian applications. At the same time, its military dual role adds close-range targeting radars on military aircraft/ Ground stations are just one piece of the puzzle. They work with other facilities to support China’s terrestrial space network. The Fact we have 5 in South America should raise some interest and care to defend against their potential dual role in case of hostilities. All the sites, integrated with Powerful optical telescopes, can supplement data received by ground stations with details about the visual characteristics of objects in space.
China’s inventory also includes Space tracking and surveillance ships, which can perform many of the same TT&C functions by adding mobility. Coverage from all platforms, land and sea, ensures continuous contact with a satellite but also provides redundancy. China has put its 4th geosynchronous optical remote-sensing satellite into orbit as of December 2023. Although it claims it was a civilian platform for crop yield estimation, weather forecasting, and disaster prevention, it does have a dual mode or military application as a military reconnaissance satellite. It is the biggest of all three previous satellites, operating on an LEO (Low Earth Orbit), where most military satellites operate. This brings up to 32 Chinese (LEO) satellites and adds one more SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) satellite, which they also claim to be used strictly for civilian use estimation of land resources.
However, as an ASAR Satellite Interpreters Course graduate, I can attest to its potential dual role once you exploit the imagery. The PLA intends to have redundant coverage of the Indo-Pacific Ocean and their area of influence and be capable of detecting movement and changes within the region, which includes all naval vessels, aircraft, or troop movements on the ground, which are the real targets of this platform. Their footprint in Latin America is robust and must be considered a threat to the U.S. They have investments in all strategic minerals (Lithium, Copper, and many other raw materials) and have satellite ground stations and ports. All of which have an intrinsic dual role in time of war.
References:
CSIS. (Clayton Swope) January 19, 2024 No place to hide: A look into China’s Geosynchronous Surveillance Capabilities.
Retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-place-hide-look-chinas-geosynchronous-surveillance-capabilities
CSIS: (Matthew P. Funaiole, Dana Kim, Brian Hart and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.) October 04, 2022 Eyes on the Skies China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America
Retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/eyes-skies-chinas-growing-space-footprint-south-america
CE: (Steven Feldstein) September 3rd, 2024 Why catching up to Starlink is a Priority to Beijing
Retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/08/china-starlink-qianfan-satellite-internet-launch-priority?lang=en
CFR: ( Zongyuan Zoe Liu) August 26, 2024 Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports
Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports