06 Apr Why the Left Needs a Weakened Ecuador
By,
Jesús Daniel Romero, Co-Founder and Senior Fellow, MSI2
Ecuador has become a key point for drug trafficking and political instability in Latin America. From my experience in diplomatic missions combating drug trafficking at the U.S. Consulate in Ecuador (2014-2016), as well as my assignments in Peru (2008-2014) and Guatemala (2017-2022), I have witnessed firsthand how cartels and authoritarian governments manipulate the economy and institutions to strengthen their control.
Drug Trafficking, Guerrillas, and the Left: An Implicit Alliance
It is important to note that we lack direct evidence proving an explicit relationship between the left and organized crime in Latin America. However, historical patterns and political decisions during certain governments suggest a functional complicity that has benefited drug trafficking and guerrilla groups. In Ecuador’s case, during Rafael Correa’s administration (2007-2017), clear signs of this dynamic emerged, marked by tolerance toward narco-guerrilla groups, an alliance with Chavismo, and decisions like the termination of the Manta military base agreement.
In Ecuador, the influence of groups like the ELN and FARC dissidents became evident along the northern border, where they found refuge after the armed conflict in Colombia, expanding their operations and establishing ties with Mexican cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). While no documents prove a formal pact, the left, through allied governments like Correa’s, appears to have facilitated this expansion by prioritizing ideological agendas over effective security measures, creating an environment of impunity that criminal networks exploited.
The cartels provide funding and logistics to guerrilla groups, while the guerrillas offer territorial security and military training. The left, in turn, has contributed with an anti-imperialist narrative that, in practice, has weakened institutions and allowed these alliances to thrive. This model, visible in Venezuela with the Cartel of the Suns and the Maduro regime (Ellis, 2021), relies on a fragile state. In Ecuador, destabilization serves as fertile ground for the left to blame “neoliberalism” and promote populist agendas, potentially funded by illicit flows.
Artisanal Fishing: A Key Link in Cocaine Transport
A little-discussed but crucial aspect of the expansion of drug trafficking in Ecuador is the role of the artisanal fishing industry, co-opted by criminal networks for cocaine transport. Artisanal fishermen, operating mainly in coastal provinces like Esmeraldas, Manabí, Guayas, Santa Elena, and El Oro, have become an essential human resource for drug trafficking, using vessels such as go-fasts, semisubmersibles, and low-profile boats to move drugs toward Central America and the United States (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2023).
Ecuador’s artisanal fishing fleet is significant, with estimates ranging from 11,323 vessels according to the Ministry of Production, Foreign Trade, Investment, and Fisheries, to as many as 50,000 according to other sources (UNODC, 2023). However, fishermen face extreme precarity: according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, 91% earn less than the basic family basket (710 dollars), and 68% earn below the minimum wage (386 dollars) (National Institute of Statistics and Censuses [INEC], 2010). This poverty, combined with the lack of effective public policies, has made many fishermen easy targets for drug trafficking mafias.
Criminal networks exploit the fishermen’s maritime skills, their knowledge of Pacific routes, and access to subsidized fuel to turn them into key links in the drug trafficking chain. In Esmeraldas, for example, it is estimated that millions of gallons of gasoline intended for artisanal fishing are diverted annually for illicit activities, including supplying fuel to vessels transporting cocaine. This subsidized fuel is transported to places like Tumaco, Colombia, where its price triples, benefiting criminal networks.
The vessels used by fishermen for drug trafficking include:
– Go-fasts: Fast boats that evade maritime patrols, though their use has declined with advances in detection technology.
– Semisubmersibles (narco-submarines): Designed to be undetectable by radar or sonar, they can carry up to 10 tons of cocaine over 3,200 kilometers. In 2010, Ecuadorian authorities seized a narco-submarine on the border with Colombia, capable of submerging up to 20 meters (BBC News, 2010).
– Low-profile vessels: Modified common boats that minimize visibility, ideal for evading detection.
Fishermen do not always participate voluntarily; many are victims of extortion or forced recruitment. In Manabí and Esmeraldas, mafias extort fishermen, stealing outboard motors and leaving them adrift, while others are co-opted with promises of quick money. It is estimated that hundreds of Ecuadorian fishermen are imprisoned in countries like the U.S., Guatemala, and Colombia for drug-related crimes.
This situation reflects the vulnerability of fishing communities and the complicity of a corrupt system that has allowed resource diversion and a lack of maritime control. During Rafael Correa’s government, tolerance toward narco-guerrilla groups like the FARC and ELN on the Ecuadorian border, combined with the decision to close the Manta base, facilitated the expansion of these criminal networks, which today exploit fishermen as pawns in a broader regional power game (Semana, 2008).
The Cocaine Pirates of 2014: An Example of Complicity Under Correa
A revealing episode of this dynamic occurred in 2014, during Rafael Correa’s administration, with the rise of the so-called “cocaine pirates.” These groups, operating from the coasts of Manabí, Esmeraldas, and Guayas, were artisanal fishermen co-opted or extorted by criminal networks to transport drugs at sea. In March 2014, Insight Crime documented how these pirates hijacked fishing boats or turned them into service stations for Colombian and Mexican narcos, taking advantage of the lack of maritime control following the closure of the U.S. base in Manta in 2009—a flagship measure by Correa symbolizing his rejection of cooperation with the U.S.
A notable case occurred that year when Ecuadorian authorities, with international support, intercepted vessels in Jaramijó and Manta loaded with cocaine. Fishermen recounted nighttime assaults by pirates armed with AK-47s, who stole fuel or recruited them with irresistible offers amid their extreme poverty. Some, like Marco Sánchez, a fisherman from Jaramijó cited in reports from the time, joined out of necessity after years of state neglect, while others were left adrift if they resisted. This phenomenon was no accident: the departure of the Manta base, which conducted thousands of anti-drug operations annually, left a vacuum that the pirates quickly filled, with the apparent complacency of a government that prioritized ideological sovereignty over security.
Under Correa, tolerance toward the FARC and ELN on the border—evidenced by Raúl Reyes’ documents after the 2008 Angostura bombing—and the extensive relationship with Chavismo, which funded allied agendas with petrodollars, created a permissive environment. By 2014, maritime drug trafficking was a consolidated industry, with narco-submarines and low-profile vessels transporting tons of cocaine to Central America. Corruption in ports and the lack of patrolling allowed the pirates to operate with impunity, while the government promoted a false “island of peace” narrative that masked the advance of organized crime. Although there is no direct evidence of an explicit agreement between Correa and the narcos, these policies and omissions suggest a practical complicity that benefited criminal networks.
Maritime Container Transport: A Highway for Cocaine
In addition to artisanal fishing, the international maritime container transport industry has become one of the preferred methods for drug trafficking networks to export large cocaine shipments with remarkable ease. This system exploits the enormous volume of legal goods moving daily through global ports, making thorough inspection of every container difficult. Traffickers hide drugs among legitimate products like bananas, tuna, or construction materials, or even within the structures of the containers themselves, taking advantage of lax controls and corruption at certain points in the logistics chain (UNODC, 2023). The ability to move tons of cocaine in a single shipment, combined with the difficulty of detection, makes this method an efficient and relatively low-risk option for criminal organizations.
Ecuador, with strategic ports like Guayaquil, has become a hub for this activity. Drugs produced in clandestine laboratories in Colombia and Peru, or transported from the Ecuadorian border, are funneled to these ports for export to global markets, particularly Europe and the United States. In Europe, this method has been evident in several record seizures highlighting the scale of the problem. In February 2021, German and Belgian customs authorities seized 23 tons of cocaine in the ports of Hamburg and Antwerp, considered the largest seizure in European history at the time. The drugs, originating from Paraguay, were hidden in containers with cans of putty and paint, with an estimated street value of several billion euros (Deutsche Welle, 2021).
This maritime method is complemented by the use of small aircraft as a swift and direct means to transport cocaine from Ecuador to the United States, using Central America as a bridge. These small planes, often operated from clandestine airstrips in rural or jungle areas like the provinces of Manabí, Esmeraldas, or Sucumbíos, exploit rugged geography and the lack of air surveillance to take off with loads ranging from 300 to 1,000 kilograms per flight (UNODC, 2023). Routes typically include stops in countries like Honduras, Guatemala, or Mexico, where the drugs are transferred to other transport methods or stored before crossing the U.S. border. From my experience in Guatemala (2017-2022), I observed how these operations relied on local corruption and the inadequacy of radar systems—a pattern repeated in Ecuador.
These operations, both maritime and aerial, reveal how drug trafficking has diversified its strategies in Ecuador, challenging authorities with their scale and sophistication. The lack of control in ports and airspace, exacerbated by institutional corruption that flourished under permissive governments like Correa’s, has turned the country into an ideal platform for these trafficking methods. The left, by weakening institutions and tolerating the advance of organized crime, has allowed drug trafficking to embed itself in key sectors of the economy and logistics, perpetuating the instability that benefits them politically.
Daniel Noboa’s Calls for Help and the Lack of International Response
President Daniel Noboa has issued multiple calls for help to the international community to curb the violence and drug trafficking crisis facing Ecuador. Since taking office, he has declared organized crime an enemy of the state, implemented emergency measures, and requested support from international organizations.
However, the response has been limited. Neighboring countries have not done enough to contain the spread of drug trafficking, and the regional left has sought to downplay the severity of Ecuador’s crisis, as a chaotic Ecuador strengthens their narrative that the “neoliberal model” has failed. The involvement of artisanal fishermen, the use of maritime containers, and small aircraft in drug trafficking—fueled by a lack of state control and corruption—are clear examples of how instability benefits the left’s agendas, which prefer a weak and permeable country for organized crime.
Criminal organizations have responded with direct attacks on Noboa’s government. Ecuadorian prisons, controlled by drug trafficking mafias, have become operational hubs for crime, challenging state authority. Meanwhile, organized crime has launched coordinated attacks in major cities, with assassinations of prosecutors, attacks on journalists, and kidnappings of public officials.
The lack of international support jeopardizes Ecuador’s stability and that of the entire region. Noboa has requested cooperation in intelligence, funding to strengthen security forces, and greater commitment from neighboring countries to stop the flow of drugs and weapons. However, the silence of many nations shows a dangerous indifference to the threat Ecuador faces, leaving the country vulnerable to an enemy that transcends its borders.
A Proposal for Regional Stability: Reducing Coca Crops as Key
In this context of regional crisis, a strategy I have proposed based on my experience in combating drug trafficking is to reduce coca crops in Colombia from 253,000 hectares—according to the UNODC 2023 Report—to at least 150,000 hectares, a 40% cut that could decrease cocaine production by hundreds of tons annually. This measure, informed by my observation of how drug supply fuels violence in countries like Ecuador and Haiti, would require aggressive policies: forced eradication in areas like Nariño and Putumayo near the Ecuadorian border, combined with crop substitution programs and strengthened border control with international support.
The recent visit of Kristi Noem, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, to Colombia on March 27, 2025, during her tour of El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico, provides a relevant framework for this proposal. Noem signed an agreement with Colombian Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia to expand biometric data sharing, aiming to strengthen cooperation against transnational crime, including the Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang linked to drug trafficking and classified as a terrorist organization by the Trump administration. However, tensions during this visit, particularly over drug trafficking, reflect the challenges of aligning interests with Gustavo Petro’s left-leaning government, which prioritizes social solutions over militarized approaches.
My proposal to reduce coca crops could complement efforts like Noem’s, economically weakening groups like the Tren de Aragua, Mexican cartels (Sinaloa and CJNG), and Haitian gangs, which rely on cocaine to fund their violence. In Ecuador, where drug trafficking has co-opted artisanal fishing, ports, and air routes, and in Haiti, where gangs exploit state chaos, cutting the drug supply from Colombia would limit these networks’ resources, though not their immediate adaptability. The feasibility of this reduction faces logistical and political challenges, from corruption to resistance from coca-growing communities, but it offers a structural solution to the instability that benefits leftist agendas.
This vision of tackling the problem at its source not only responds to Noboa’s pleas but also provides a concrete alternative to the limited international response. By reducing the economic base of drug trafficking, pressure on Ecuador and other vulnerable countries could be alleviated, laying the groundwork for regional stability that counters the populist narratives thriving in chaos.
Ecuador Seeks U.S. Support: Armament and the Meeting with Mario Díaz-Balart
Complementing this strategic vision, Ecuador has intensified efforts to bolster its internal capacity against drug trafficking. On April 3, 2025, Defense Minister Gian Carlo Loffredo and Interior Minister John Reimberg met in Washington, D.C., with U.S. Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart, chairman of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, which oversees U.S. defense funding for Latin America. The meeting, described as “fruitful” by the Ecuadorian government, aimed to finalize agreements for the acquisition of weaponry, technology, and military training—a key step in the fight against organized crime (Vera, 2025).
The significance of this alliance goes beyond the military: it represents Ecuador’s attempt to align with the U.S. to counter the influence of the regional left and its criminal allies. Díaz-Balart, with his history of sanctions against regimes like Maduro’s and his rejection of tolerance toward groups like the FARC, embodies a vision that sees a strong Ecuador as a barrier against the advance of narco-terrorism and socialism in Latin America. This cooperation, alongside proposals like reducing coca crops in Colombia, could shield the country from two fronts: cutting the drug supply at its source and strengthening its internal response capacity. However, the effectiveness of this support will depend on Noboa’s ability to implement internal reforms and combat the corruption that facilitates mafia operations, from artisanal fishing to ports and air routes.
The Role of Corruption in Consolidating Organized Crime
No drug trafficking scheme of this magnitude can operate without a fundamental element: institutional corruption. From high-ranking government officials to judges, prosecutors, police, and military personnel, many have been bought by organized crime, enabling Ecuador’s consolidation as a drug trafficking hub. Artisanal fishing, container transport, and small aircraft are clear examples of this problem: the diversion of subsidized fuel, the lack of maritime and air patrolling, and the permeability of ports are made possible by corruption among local and national authorities, allowing mafias to operate with impunity (Transparency International, 2023).
From my experience in the region, I have observed how corruption facilitates information leaks, enables the release of captured drug traffickers, and ensures the impunity of criminal networks. Without a firm strategy to eradicate corruption, any attempt to regain control of the country—whether through external support or proposals like reducing coca crops—will be thwarted from within.
Compounding the situation, Ecuador is the only country in Latin America that uses the U.S. dollar as its official currency, a highly relevant factor for cocaine cartels. Adopted in 2000 after an economic crisis (Central Bank of Ecuador, 2020), the dollar is the preferred currency of organized crime, as it allows international transactions without the volatility of local currencies and facilitates large-scale money laundering (UNODC, 2023). This characteristic makes Ecuador a key financial hub for laundering drug trafficking proceeds, as cartels can move their profits directly in the dominant global trade currency, avoiding risky or traceable conversions. As a result, the use of the dollar not only further weakens the Ecuadorian economy by integrating it into illicit flows but also exposes the country to international sanctions and enhances its appeal as an operational base for mafias.
The Left and Chaos as a Power Strategy
From my experience in combating drug trafficking and ensuring security in Latin America, I have observed common patterns in how leftist governments exploit instability: delegitimizing pro-market and anti-corruption leaders, facilitating the expansion of transnational crime, ensuring corruption as a control tool, using the migration crisis as a pressure tactic, and destabilizing the economy to justify greater state control.
The co-optation of artisanal fishing, the use of maritime containers, and small aircraft by drug trafficking are examples of how the left, by tolerating or even facilitating the presence of criminal networks, perpetuates instability to advance its agenda. Fishermen, trapped between poverty and mafia coercion, and ports and air routes, undermined by corruption, are victims of a system the left has helped create by prioritizing political control over security and economic development.
The Relationship Between Chávez, Correa, and Uribe: A Case of Destabilization
The relationship between Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Álvaro Uribe illustrates how the left uses instability to weaken its ideological opponents. Chávez, president of Venezuela (1999-2013), and Correa, president of Ecuador (2007-2017), shared a vision aligned with 21st Century Socialism, an anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. project. Both were part of Latin America’s “pink tide” and allied through the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which Ecuador joined in 2009 (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2016). Chávez, with Venezuela’s oil resources, funded allied governments to counter U.S. influence and pro-market leaders like Uribe, president of Colombia (2002-2010).
Uribe, with his Democratic Security policy, fought the FARC and ELN with a firm hand, reducing homicides in Colombia by 50% and dismantling much of the guerrilla structures, according to data from the Colombian Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense of Colombia, 2010). This made him a key U.S. ally and a target for Chávez and Correa, who saw him as a threat to their Bolivarian project.
– The Angostura Bombing (2008): On March 1, 2008, Colombia bombed an FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory, killing guerrilla leader Raúl Reyes. This attack sparked the 2008 Andean Crisis: Correa and Chávez accused Uribe of violating Ecuadorian sovereignty, breaking diplomatic relations and mobilizing troops to the border. Documents found at the camp suggested the FARC had financed Correa’s 2006 campaign and that his government tolerated guerrillas on the border, fueling tensions with Uribe (Semana, 2008).
– Support for Guerrillas: Chávez allowed the FARC and ELN to operate from Venezuela, while Correa, by not classifying the FARC as terrorists, facilitated their presence in Ecuador. This not only weakened Uribe but also allowed criminal networks to expand into sectors like artisanal fishing, maritime transport, and air routes, now exploited by drug trafficking (Ellis, 2021).
– Diplomatic Isolation: In forums like UNASUR, Chávez and Correa isolated Uribe, portraying him as a warmonger serving Washington. This delegitimization strategy aimed to prevent Uribe’s security and free-market model from spreading in the region (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2016).
The extensive relationship between Correa and Chavismo, including joining ALBA and ideological alignment, reinforced an environment where tolerance toward organized crime flourished, as seen with the Manta base closure and the rise of the cocaine pirates.
Ecuador: The Next Battleground in the Geopolitical War
Throughout my career, I have worked in Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala, countries where the fight against organized crime and corruption has been key to stability. If Ecuador manages to strengthen itself and regain control of its institutions, the left loses. That’s why they seek to weaken it, preventing it from following the paths of Argentina under Javier Milei or El Salvador under Nayib Bukele, and ensuring it remains trapped in a model of permanent crisis.
Ecuador is not just a nation in crisis; it is a reflection of the ideological struggle defining Latin America’s future. A strong state with resilient institutions is the only real barrier against the advance of radical leftist agendas and organized crime. Artisanal fishing, maritime container transport, and small aircraft, co-opted by drug trafficking, are examples of how instability benefits the left: by keeping fishing communities in precarity, allowing mafias to operate with impunity in ports and airspace, and tolerating corruption, a cycle of violence and poverty is perpetuated that the left can exploit to justify its return to power.
If this spiral of violence is not stopped, Ecuador could become the next stronghold of narco-terrorism in the region, consolidating an instability corridor connecting Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico under the same criminal model. The fight for Ecuador is not just a security issue; it is a battle for the future of democracy in Latin America, where proposals like reducing coca crops and strategic alliances with countries like the U.S. could make the difference between chaos and recovery.
References
Banco Central del Ecuador. (2020). Dolarización en Ecuador: 20 años después. https://www.bce.ec/index.php/publicaciones
BBC News. (2010, July 3). Ecuador finds drug-smuggling submarine. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10501347
Deutsche Welle. (2021, February 24). Record cocaine seizure in Germany and Belgium. https://www.dw.com/en/record-cocaine-seizure-in-germany-and-belgium/a-56678912
Ellis, R. E. (2021). Transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: From evolving threats to integrated responses. Lexington Books.
Insight Crime. (2022). Narco-politics in Latin America: The nexus of crime and governance. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/narco-politics-latin-america
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos. (2010). Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010. https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/censo-2010
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Petras, J., & Veltmeyer, H. (2016). The new extractivism: A post-neoliberal development model or imperialism of the twenty-first century? Zed Books.
Semana. (2008, March 8). Los computadores de Raúl Reyes: FARC y Correa bajo la lupa. https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-computadores-raul-reyes/90876-3
Transparency International. (2023). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2023). World Drug Report 2023. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2023.html
Vera, M. (2025, April 3). Tras visita a Washington, ministros anuncian nuevos acuerdos entre Ecuador y Estados Unidos en materia de seguridad y defensa. Primicias. https://www.primicias.ec/seguridad/ecuador-estados-unidos-reunion-bloque-seguridad-narcotrafico-93193/