24 Apr Losing Altitude: U.S. Lost Fighter Jet Contracts to Sweden in Brazil Colombia
By,
Juan González, Senior Fellow, MSI²
Over the 20 years, I have witnessed, through my regular visits to numerous Latin American countries, a notable evolution in their defense procurement philosophy and attitudes towards the US sales of defense equipment to them.
Historically reliant on the United States for military hardware, training, and strategic alignment, countries in the region are now actively seeking to diversify their sources of military equipment because the US fielding is slow and, in many instances, subject to US monitoring. The Arms Export Control Act mandates that the U.S. government conduct End-Use Monitoring (EUM) to ensure foreign recipients of U.S. defense articles comply with agreed conditions regarding their use, transfer, and security. EUM applies to both government-to-government and direct commercial sales and may include inspections, inventories, an: d record reviews. Over the years, I heard from senior foreign military officers in the region that they fully understand that the “end monitoring” is a contractual obligation but an unnecessary irritant. As one officer put it: “If we are considered friends, it should not be included”.
In my experience, regardless of their views, they would always prefer US-built weapons that any others in the world, largely due to their reliability, support, and maintenance. Moreover, the US military maintains security assistance offices in over 30 embassies in the region. With the robust U.S.–Latin America partnership developed over the years, there exists a cadre of Latin American officers and enlisted personnel who have studied at and received training in U.S. military institutions. Their preference for U.S. systems cannot be overstated.
This shift reflects deeper transformations in how these nations conceptualize sovereignty, resilience, and international partnership. Nowadays, defense procurement is linked to broader national development agendas, including domestic industrial growth, technological independence, and geopolitical autonomy.1
Among the most striking examples of this trend are Brazil and Colombia—two countries with significant military budgets and historically close ties to the United States. In 2022, the President designated Colombia as a major non-NATO Ally (MNNA), aimed at further strengthening military ties between the United States and Colombia. As an MNNA, Colombia is eligible for Foreign Military Financing loans or guarantees, which would expand their ability to acquire major U.S. weapons systems.2 Since becoming a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2019, Brazil has deepened defense cooperation with the United States under the 2015 Defense Cooperation Agreement, focusing on interoperability, technology sharing, joint exercises, and capability development. 3
Despite a legacy of deep and strong defense relations, both nations chose to procure Saab’s Gripen fighter jets over U.S.-manufactured alternatives such as the F-16 or F/A-18. Brazil initiated this trend in 2014 when it awarded a multibillion-dollar contract to Sweden’s Saab, a decision grounded in a favorable offset package and promises of technology transfer.4 Colombia, traditionally one of Washington’s closest military partners in the hemisphere, followed suit in 2025, signaling a dramatic pivot away from the expected path of U.S. defense alignment.5
These decisions upend long-standing assumptions about the durability of U.S. influence in the region. For decades, the United States was not just a supplier but a gatekeeper of Latin America’s military modernization. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, combined with extensive military-to-military cooperation and defense assistance, entrenched Washington’s role as the primary source of air power for partner nations. The recent loss of contracts to Sweden, a relatively neutral and smaller actor on the global stage, challenges the effectiveness of this model.6
Critically, the outcomes in Brazil and Colombia were not determined solely by technical evaluations of aircraft capabilities or price comparisons. I have confidence that they were shaped by a matrix of strategic and political calculations: which partner offered sovereignty over weapons systems, which provided genuine industrial participation, and the prevailing political landscape in both countries and the United States. By far, the Saab’s Gripen is not the most advanced fighter on the global market, but was packaged with diplomatic tact, industrial collaboration, and operational flexibility that appeal to governments seeking to avoid dependency on great powers.7 Not only is dependency a factor, but also the prevailing political relations between the US and both countries at the time they were making those decisions, an issue I discussed further in this article. In both cases, I observed the US participants’ commitment to get the deal done fairly and most expediently to ensure there were no political biases. The US spent a lot of tax dollars attempting to convince both nations’ political and military leaders that the US fighter was far beyond the system. The US understood as well that, for example, in the case of Brazil, they wanted industrial cooperation and operational flexibility, both of which we could not deliver because the transfer technologies are not only highly regulated but also require congressional approval. 8,9
The multidimensional reasons why the United States lost these high-profile fighter jet contracts is an indication of new mindsets and political machinations. I am certain that the intersection of defense economics, procurement politics, and strategic realignment is at the core to understand how decisions that may appear transactional on the surface are rooted in deeper shifts in regional identity and political power dynamics. By comparing the Brazilian and Colombian cases and situating them within the broader evolution of U.S.–Latin America defense relations, I offer insights into the perceived declining exclusivity of U.S. influence and the continued trend of a more pluralistic and independent defense market in Latin America.10
Shifting Alignments: Diplomatic Forces Shaping Latin American Defense Choices
Sweden’s diplomatic strategy in Latin America has been characterized by pragmatism, policy continuity, and an emphasis on sovereign partnerships rather than hegemonic alignment. Its image as a non-interventionist, technologically advanced, and politically neutral actor has enabled it to navigate the defense sectors of countries like Brazil and Colombia without the baggage often associated with U.S. bilateral security frameworks. 11 This strategic posture is exemplified by Sweden’s successful courtship of Brazil through high-level political engagement and reciprocal institutional arrangements under the Gripen E/F deal. For Brazil, it included unprecedented levels of technology transfer, local assembly, and long-term industrial integration. 12 I judge that Sweden positioned itself not just as a vendor, but as a cooperative partner contributing to Brazil’s long-term defense autonomy and industrial growth.
President Milei’s Role in Argentina’s F-16 Acquisition
Argentine President Javier Milei has played a pivotal role in advancing the country’s acquisition of 24 second-hand F-16 fighter jets from Denmark, marking the most significant military procurement since Argentina’s return to democracy. The decision reflects a deliberate strategic shift by the Milei administration to modernize the nation’s air force, strengthen ties with the United States, and realign Argentina’s foreign policy toward the West.
In contrast, U.S. defense diplomacy in Latin America remains burdened by historical asymmetries and a perception of policy inconsistency. Strategic military sales and security cooperation programs are frequently filtered through broader foreign policy instruments such as the Leahy Laws, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Human Rights Reports.13 While these mechanisms reflect commendable normative values, they also limit U.S. flexibility when engaging with governments that perceive conditionality as an infringement on sovereignty or operational independence. This tension has become more acute under progressive or nationalistic administrations in Latin America that most of the view Washington’s overtures as coercive or politically motivated.
In Brazil’s case, bilateral relations with the United States were complicated by the fallout from the 2013 NSA espionage scandal, which severely eroded trust between the two nations at a time when Brazil was evaluating proposals for its multibillion-dollar fighter replacement program.14 Although the U.S. offered the technologically superior F/A-18 Super Hornet, its proposal lacked the industrial offsets and full technology transfer assurances that Sweden offered—a deficiency that proved decisive.15 Moreover, U.S. reluctance to commit to local production and intellectual property sharing starkly contrasted with Sweden’s willingness to integrate Embraer into the heart of the Gripen program.
Colombia presents another recent example of diplomatic recalibration. Under President Gustavo Petro, the country’s foreign and security policy has drifted from its traditionally close alignment with Washington. Petro’s administration has emphasized regional autonomy, alternative development models, and a critical stance toward U.S.-driven drug policy frameworks.16 These shifts have contributed to a more skeptical posture toward U.S. military assistance and arms sales, particularly when tied to human rights and rug eradication benchmarks that Colombian defense officials sometimes interpret as punitive or politically selective. At the same time, Sweden’s apolitical posture and offer of a flexible financing package for the Gripen positioned it as a more ideologically neutral and technically collaborative alternative, specifically if the recipient country has advanced defense production industries.17
Furthermore, Sweden’s approach has been reinforced by broader European Union strategies that emphasize cooperative security and defense industrial diplomacy, rather than transactional arms sales.18 This aligns well with Latin American preferences for horizontal partnerships that include industrial development, strategic dialogue, and defense diversification. In contrast, the United States has struggled to adjust its diplomatic posture to this emerging reality, often defaulting to legacy frameworks that prioritize security assistance over equal industrial partnerships.
In sum, while the United States continues to maintain a dominant presence in military training, intelligence cooperation, and counter-narcotics missions in Latin America, its diplomatic approach to defense sales lags behind competitors like Sweden in offering holistic, politically viable, and economically integrated packages. Unless the U.S. recalibrates its strategic messaging and reduces bureaucratic frictions in foreign military sales, it risks continued erosion of influence in a region where traditional leverage is no longer sufficient.
Winning with Technology: Why Transferability Trumps Superiority
While U.S. platforms such as the F-16V and F/A-18 Super Hornet boast advanced avionics, stealth features, and combat-proven reliability, Sweden’s Gripen E/F offers competitive advantages in terms of modularity, ease of maintenance, and interoperability with both NATO and non-NATO partners.19 Most critically, Saab’s offer to Brazil included full technology transfer, local assembly by Embraer, and future co-development rights—conditions the U.S. has historically been unwilling to meet due to intellectual property and export control restrictions.20
The technological promise of sovereignty and self-sustainment made the Gripen particularly appealing to Brazilian strategic planners. The ability to produce aircraft domestically and develop software and avionics independently reinforced Brazil’s ambition for regional leadership and global defense market participation.21 In 2023, Saab and Embraer inaugurated a final assembly line for the Gripen E fighter jet at Embraer’s plant in Gavião Peixoto, São Paulo State, marking a significant achievement in their technology transfer program.22
In contrast, U.S. defense firms, constrained by export control regimes, have been reluctant to offer meaningful technology transfers.23 For instance, the U.S. Air Force has acknowledged that technology transfer issues are a key consideration in decisions about relocating F-16 production lines, as seen in discussions about moving production to India.24 This strategic inflexibility has often led potential buyers to perceive U.S. offers as less favorable compared to those from countries willing to engage in deeper industrial partnerships.
Furthermore, the Gripen’s design emphasizes ease of maintenance, allowing for cost-effective operations and adaptability to various mission profiles.25 Its compatibility with a wide range of weapons systems and its open architecture enables operators to integrate indigenous systems, further enhancing operational sovereignty.26 These features, combined with the comprehensive technology transfer package, position the Gripen as a formidable option for countries seeking to bolster their defense capabilities while developing their domestic aerospace industries.
Aligning Security with Industry: The Economics Behind Procurement Decisions
In both Brazil and Colombia, cost-benefit analysis played a decisive role in the selection of the Saab Gripen over U.S. competitors. The Gripen offered a significantly lower unit cost—estimated between $85 and $100 million per aircraft—compared to the F-35’s projected cost of over $130 million, which includes substantially higher lifecycle support expenses.27 This cost advantage was crucial for countries with constrained defense budgets seeking to modernize air capabilities without overextending financial commitments.
Beyond price, Sweden provides attractive financing terms and extensive offset agreements that directly support local economic development. Like in Brazil, these industrial cooperation packages included job creation, technology sharing, and infrastructure investment, aligning with broader national goals of defense self-sufficiency and technological modernization.28 Offset agreements in Brazil alone were valued at more than $9 billion and involved over 60 companies across 18 states, with investments reaching diverse segments of the Brazilian defense sector.29
Brazil’s deal with Saab, signed in 2014 and expanded through 2023, was particularly notable for integrating Embraer as a core industrial partner. Under the agreement, Saab transferred critical engineering knowledge and supported the establishment of a Gripen final assembly line in Gavião Peixoto, São Paulo.30 This not only deepened Brazil’s aerospace manufacturing base but also enabled long-term employment and export potential. The partnership also paved the way for collaborative development of new systems such as electronic warfare and mission planning tools.31
For Colombia, currently operating an aging fleet of Israeli Kfir fighters, cost-effectiveness and ease of maintenance were key considerations. The Gripen’s lower operational costs, combined with its compatibility with multiple weapons systems and open architecture, made it an appealing solution for the Colombian Air Force.32 Sweden’s flexible delivery schedule and willingness to discuss co-production and training opportunities further strengthened its bid against U.S. offers, which often lacked comparable offset proposals and were limited by export control regulations.33 Moreover, Colombia’s interest in expanding its national aerospace capabilities aligned with the industrial model offered by Saab, unlike the relatively fixed terms offered by U.S. contractors.34
Sovereignty in the Balance: Latin America’s Pivot Toward Multipolar Security
Both Brazil and Colombia have signaled their intent to diversify security relationships in a shifting global order. Brazil’s broader defense strategy—outlined in its 2020 National Defense White Paper, and supported by the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy—emphasizes the importance of multipolarity and national autonomy, particularly in areas such as defense procurement, regional diplomacy, and technological innovation.35 This reflects Brazil’s historical commitment to an independent foreign policy, dating back to the Geisel Doctrine of the 1970s, which promoted strategic nonalignment and diversification of defense partnerships.
Colombia, under President Gustavo Petro, has similarly begun exploring alternative defense alignments. His administration has signaled a shift away from traditional U.S.-centric models of security assistance, promoting ‘South-South’ cooperation with countries like Brazil, and even extra-hemispheric actors such as India and Turkey.36 I judged these moves are partly driven by dissatisfaction with conditionalities embedded in U.S. aid programs, as well as the desire to enhance Colombia’s defense industrial base and autonomy in operational decision-making.
As previously stated, Sweden’s successful penetration of both markets with its Gripen fighter program illustrates a broader global trend: middle-income countries increasingly favor defense partnerships that offer co-production, technology transfer, and reduced political strings. 37 In essence, this is particularly attractive in a geopolitical climate marked by fragmentation, where U.S. leverage through security assistance is increasingly constrained by domestic legislative restrictions and bureaucratic delays. Moreover, non-Western suppliers such as China and Russia, Korea, are also capitalizing on this environment, offering flexible financing and fewer political prerequisites.
Sweden is pursuing parliamentary approval for the potential sale of up to 12 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E/F fighter jets, estimated at $2 billion, to Peru. It signals a continuous expansion of its aerospace presence in the region; for Peru, it offers a path to modernize its aging air force with cutting-edge, multirole combat aircraft.
Unless the United States modernizes its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policies and embraces more equitable defense partnerships, it risks ceding long-term influence in Latin America to actors better adapted to the emerging multipolar order.
Red Flags and Reset: Implications for Future U.S. Security Partnerships
The decisions by Brazil and Colombia to pursue defense procurement agreements with Sweden—despite decades of strategic alignment with the United States—highlight growing friction within the architecture of U.S. defense diplomacy in Latin America. These procurement outcomes underscore long-term structural challenges and offer a cautionary signal for U.S. policymakers, defense firms, and regional security planners.
U.S. defense firms operate within a framework heavily constrained by federal regulations such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which limit the scope of technology transfer and co-production agreements.38 While designed to safeguard national security and intellectual property, these constraints often make U.S. proposals less attractive to countries seeking strategic autonomy and indigenous defense capacity. The U.S. reluctance to share proprietary technologies or allow for local assembly contrasts sharply with Sweden’s approach under the Gripen program, which prioritized partnership, transparency, and flexibility.39
In both Brazil and Colombia, this inflexibility has cost the U.S. critical opportunities to expand influence and build durable industrial linkages. Latin American defense ministries are increasingly focused on dual-use industrial development and autonomy—not merely tactical performance. Unless the U.S. revises its export policies and enables limited, trusted transfer arrangements, it risks ceding more space to competitors with less restrictive frameworks.
The perception of inconsistent or ideologically selective engagement has weakened traditional U.S. alliances in the region. In recent years, Washington’s security posture has been criticized for being overly conditional—tying arms sales or military cooperation to human rights evaluations, drug interdiction performance, or alignment with U.S. geopolitical interests.40 While normatively justified, many Latin American governments viewed these conditions as forms of coercion rather than collaboration.
By contrast, Sweden’s low-key, technocratic diplomacy has resonated with governments seeking politically neutral partnerships. The ability to engage without being drawn into broader strategic rivalries is an increasing asset in a region wary of great power competition. Brazil’s rejection of the F/A-18 following the 2013 U.S. surveillance scandal,41 and Colombia’s shift under President Petro are not anomalies—they reflect systemic fatigue with U.S. inconsistency and strategic overreach.
Defense sales are not merely commercial transactions—they are tools of soft power and statecraft. The failure of the U.S. to offer industrial offsets, co-production agreements, or joint ventures has weakened its appeal in countries prioritizing technology transfer and local job creation. In Brazil, Saab’s collaboration with Embraer led to the establishment of a local final assembly line, deepening national aerospace capacity and creating export potential for the Gripen E.42
In Colombia, Saab’s willingness to consider technology-sharing frameworks and pilot training cooperation stands in contrast to the relatively rigid packages typically offered by U.S. firms.43 The absence of a strategic industrial plan in U.S. defense diplomacy places it at a growing disadvantage, particularly in an era where economic development and technological sovereignty are integral to national security doctrines.
If these dynamics remain unaddressed, the U.S. risks accelerating a broader realignment in regional defense markets. Countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Peru are actively pursuing “balanced multipolarity” in their procurement strategies—welcoming European, Israeli, Korean and even Chinese technologies. Russia’s past sales to Venezuela and Nicaragua demonstrate the vulnerability of the hemisphere to influence from rival powers.
Without reforming its foreign military sales framework, the U.S. risks losing not only contracts but influence, access, and interoperability in a region it once dominated. Defense partnerships must now be measured not solely by weapon performance, but by the quality of political and industrial trust they generate.
Rearming Influence: Strategic Pathways to Restore U.S. Defense Competitiveness in Latin America
The United States is facing a critical juncture in its defense relations with Latin America. Recent procurement outcomes in Brazil and Colombia—favoring Sweden’s Saab Gripen over U.S. aircraft—reflect a broader erosion of American influence in a region once considered a stronghold of U.S. defense cooperation. This trend is driven not merely by cost considerations, but by Washington’s strategic inflexibility, limited industrial integration, and increasingly strained political relationships. To reverse this trajectory, the U.S. must recalibrate its approach.
(1) reforming Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policies to allow flexible technology transfer,
(2) launching a regional defense innovation and offset framework,
and (3) reinvigorating strategic defense diplomacy tailored to Latin American priorities.
Together, these measures aim to reestablish U.S. relevance in a multipolar defense market and align American offers with the sovereignty, industrial growth, and strategic autonomy sought by Latin American partners.
In February 2025, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee’s newly established Foreign Arms Sales Task Force convened its inaugural closed-door meeting, bringing together lawmakers, congressional staff, and representatives from both established defense contractors and emerging firms. The session focused on the bureaucratic hurdles impeding timely access to U.S.-made defense systems for international partners. According to the Task Force’s current assessment, the United States’ foreign military sales framework is falling behind the pace of global demand.
1. Modernize Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Policy to Enable Flexible Technology Transfer and Industrial Collaboration
The U.S. defense acquisition model, constrained by ITAR, export controls, and risk-averse intellectual property protections, limits its ability to meet Latin America’s growing demand for co-development and domestic production.
Actionable Steps:
- Create a regional waiver framework within FMS to authorize case-by-case technology transfer and co-production arrangements with trusted Latin American partners (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Chile).
- Expand Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) authorities to structure joint industrial ventures and licensing agreements tied to economic development goals.
- Assign a dedicated Defense Industrial Liaison Team for the Americas to facilitate government-to-government negotiations around offsets, intellectual property, and defense innovation.
Impact: Aligns U.S. offers with market expectations for sovereignty, builds long-term industrial trust, and counters European and Chinese offers centered on local integration.
See: U.S. ITAR Policy
2. Establish a U.S.-Latin America Defense Innovation & Offset Partnership Framework
Countries like Brazil and Colombia prioritized the Saab Gripen due to its offset commitments, technology transfer, and job creation mechanisms. U.S. firms rarely offer equivalent industrial incentives, putting them at a disadvantage.
Actionable Steps:
- Launch a regional offset and innovation initiative through DoD, DSCA, and USTDA to support U.S. contractors offering co-development, research partnerships, and training packages.
- Fund public-private ventures that support dual-use technology exchange, pilot training, and MRO (maintenance, repair, overhaul) capacity in-country.
- Leverage U.S. institutions like DARPA, AFWERX, and DIU to connect Latin American defense stakeholders with emerging tech platforms and applications.
Impact: Converts U.S. defense sales into full-spectrum strategic partnerships that build influence, generate local goodwill, and embed U.S. standards and systems in the region.
See: Saab–Embraer partnership
3. Reinvigorate Strategic Defense Diplomacy to Rebuild Trust and Political Alignment
Recent procurement losses in Brazil and Colombia reflect not only commercial disadvantages but also a deterioration in diplomatic trust. U.S. messaging is often perceived as inconsistent, conditional, or misaligned with regional priorities.
Actionable Steps:
- Expand the role of U.S. defense attachés and security cooperation officers to proactively engage ministries of defense on long-term planning, not just short-term sales.
- Establish U.S.-Latin America Strategic Defense Forums focused on procurement transparency, lifecycle support, and regional defense integration.
- Improve public diplomacy by integrating non-political messaging into defense offers, including climate resilience technologies, disaster response tools, and space cooperation.
Impact: Rebuilds diplomatic capital, creates a values-based but non-coercive security narrative, and ensures defense sales are viewed as enablers of mutual sovereignty—not U.S. leverage.
See: Harvard on U.S. conditionality
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