22 Dec AMLO’s Return to Public Life: Structural Risk, Criminal Penetration, and the Future of United States–Mexico Security Cooperation
By,
CDR José Adán Gutiérrez, Senior Fellow, MSI²
Dr. Rafael A. Marrero, Founder and Chief Economist, MSI²
MSI² Series Context: An Escalating Governance Crisis in Mexico
This article is part of an ongoing MSI² analytical series that documents the rapid deterioration of Mexico’s governance environment and the expanding influence of former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Each publication builds on the previous one to trace how AMLO’s persistent presence, informal power networks, and tolerance of criminal expansion have destabilized institutions, weakened the rule of law, and undermined United States–Mexico security cooperation.
The series includes:
1. Gutiérrez, J. A., & Marrero, R. (2025, October 27). La triste historia de la cándida Claudia y su despiadado padrino político. MSI².
This op-ed analyzes Claudia Sheinbaum’s vulnerability to AMLO’s political dominance and compares her presidency to García Márquez’s narratives of imposed servitude and cyclical dependence.
2. Gutiérrez, J. A., & Marrero, R. (2025, September 7). Checkmate Diplomacy: The U.S. Demarche to President Sheinbaum and the Redefinition of Bilateral Security Relations. MSI².
This assessment explains the rare U.S. diplomatic demarche to Mexico City and demonstrates how AMLO-era obstruction reshaped U.S. expectations and security posture in the hemisphere.
3. Gutiérrez, J. A. (2025, August 10). Más allá de la soberanía: Un repaso de la alianza de seguridad de México con Estados Unidos. MSI².
This article reviews the evolution of bilateral security collaboration and examines how AMLO’s political environment weakened cooperation while empowering criminal organizations.
Together with this new publication, the series establishes a consistent analytic record. AMLO has been, and continues to be, the central agent of chaos, discord, and institutional erosion in Mexico. His actions carry direct consequences for regional stability and U.S. national security.
Abstract
This article analyzes the political reappearance of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and evaluates how his renewed public interventions coincide with weakened institutions, expanded criminal governance, and the deterioration of security cooperation between the United States and Mexico. The assessment draws exclusively from verifiable public sources and applies intelligence analysis standards. It integrates the February 2025 decision by the United States to classify major Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, reviews documented attempts by criminal groups to influence AMLO-linked campaigns, and examines the resignation of Attorney General Alejandro Gertz Manero as part of a broader pattern that protects political and criminal networks.
The article also incorporates cultural variables that help explain why AMLO retains informal authority in a country facing institutional decay. These cultural factors enrich, but do not replace, the evidence. Taken together, the data support the conclusion that AMLO now functions as the central figure of a political structure that benefits organizations formally designated as terrorists by the United States. His renewed prominence signals an intensifying crisis and raises urgent questions for the future of bilateral security cooperation.
1. Introduction
Mexico is experiencing escalating institutional fragility and expanding criminal power. Criminal organizations govern large regions of the country, and rule-of-law institutions have lost independence and capacity. United States–Mexico security cooperation has deteriorated. These conditions form the setting for the renewed political activity of former President López Obrador. His reactivation raises questions about President Claudia Sheinbaum’s autonomy, the resilience of Mexican institutions, and the future of hemispheric security.
This analysis draws on verified public sources, congressional testimony, judicial records, and academic studies. It incorporates the consequences of the United States decision to classify six major Mexican criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. These developments underscore the strategic importance of understanding AMLO’s continued influence. The evidence supports the conclusion that Mexico is evolving toward a dual power structure in which AMLO maintains significant informal authority while criminal organizations operate with persistent impunity. This dynamic weakens bilateral security cooperation at a moment of historic criminal violence.
Mexico’s instability is also shaped by deeper cultural patterns. Comparative political research, including the model developed by Hofstede, shows that political systems with high power distance, strong collectivist loyalties, and weak institutional identity often personalize authority. In such environments, citizens relate to leaders as caretakers rather than as temporary stewards of public institutions. Social programs are often interpreted as favors. Loyalty attaches to individuals more readily than to institutions. These cultural conditions help explain why AMLO retains political influence and why his reactivation destabilizes institutions in ways that benefit criminal networks.
2. AMLO’s Reentry Into Political Life and the Structure of Informal Power
AMLO did not withdraw from public life after leaving office. His interventions mirror patterns described by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2023) and Weyland (2020), who note that charismatic leaders often preserve influence through informal networks that remain active beyond their formal tenure.
AMLO continues to shape expectations inside Morena. His statements influence legislative strategies and security positions. His informal authority often overrides decisions made by President Sheinbaum. This produces a dual power structure where constitutional authority resides in the presidency, and ideological and emotional authority resides in AMLO.
This arrangement creates instability. Criminal organizations flourish when political authority is divided. AMLO’s reemergence, therefore, intensifies fragmentation and creates an environment conducive to criminal expansion.
2.1 Cultural Conditions That Sustain Informal Authority
AMLO’s continued influence is rooted in cultural tendencies that personalize governance. High power distance encourages acceptance of hierarchical leaders. Collectivist norms prioritize group loyalty over institutional loyalty. Low tolerance for uncertainty encourages reliance on simplified narratives rather than complex institutional processes.
AMLO understood these dynamics and used them to strengthen his informal authority. His administration built affective bonds with vulnerable populations who interpreted direct transfers as expressions of personal care. This emotional architecture weakened institutional identity and reinforced personal loyalty. AMLO’s reactivation, therefore, revives not only political networks but also the cultural mechanisms that sustain personalist authority.
3. Verified Evidence of Criminal Attempts to Influence AMLO-Linked Campaigns
3.1 Publicly Documented Attempts to Influence Campaigns
Multiple reputable sources show that criminal organizations attempted to influence political movements associated with AMLO. ProPublica reported attempts by the Sinaloa organization to channel funds into AMLO’s 2006 campaign (Miller, 2024). The New York Times reported that intelligence agencies reviewed information suggesting attempted criminal influence during AMLO’s 2018 campaign (Ahmed & Semple, 2024). InSight Crime (2023) documents the expansion of Sinaloa and CJNG operations during the AMLO administration and describes weakened federal enforcement as a contributing factor.
3.2 Interpretation
The evidence does not prove that AMLO accepted cartel money. It does show that criminal organizations viewed AMLO-linked movements as vulnerable to influence. The political climate during the AMLO period reduced enforcement pressure and lowered operational risks for criminal groups. These conditions strengthened criminal governance and weakened institutional capacity.
4. Criminal Penetration of the State and the Inner Protection Network
Research from CIDE shows that criminal governance expanded into more than half of Mexican municipalities during the AMLO period (CIDE, 2023). This expansion occurred alongside political decisions that weakened oversight and encouraged criminal penetration.
Adán Augusto López exerted influence over barredora enforcement actions. Ojeda’s involvement in fiscal huachicol operations extended criminal penetration into customs and revenue systems. Andy López Beltrán operated as an intermediary managing loyalty networks and economic incentives.
The killing of Carlos Manzo in Oaxaca exposed the violent conditions within Morena-dominated regions. Repression of dissent in Morena-led states illustrated the selective use of force to protect aligned networks. Morena’s legislative supermajorities eliminated oversight and entrenched a political architecture resembling a criminal protection system centered on AMLO.
5. Removal of Attorney General Alejandro Gertz Manero
Gertz Manero resigned under political pressure (Reuters, 2025). Bloomberg reported that a sensitive fuel-smuggling investigation coincided with his removal (Bloomberg, 2025). El País documented Morena’s support for appointing Ernestina Godoy, known for her political loyalty (El País, 2025). AP News confirmed her selection and alignment with AMLO-era structures (Associated Press, 2025).
Gertz had pursued politically sensitive investigations. His removal eliminated an institutional barrier that constrained political and criminal networks aligned with AMLO. Godoy’s appointment collapsed prosecutorial independence during a period of severe criminal penetration.
6. Claudia Sheinbaum and the Constrained Presidency
President Sheinbaum lacks an independent political base and depends on structures loyal to AMLO. She frequently defers to him on national strategy. His public contradictions of her positions diminish her authority.
This dynamic is reinforced by cultural expectations that personalize leadership and attach legitimacy to the figure of the benefactor. AMLO established emotional credibility with key social sectors. His presence limits Sheinbaum’s ability to assert autonomy. Divided authority reduces enforcement capacity and benefits criminal organizations.
7. United States Designation of Mexican Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
In February 2025, the United States designated six major Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Wilson Center, 2025). The Department of the Treasury classifies the same groups as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (United States Department of the Treasury, 2025). These actions expand U.S. legal authority through material support statutes.
No indictment alleges that AMLO provided material support. However, behaviors within his political environment align with the operational needs of designated organizations. This alignment elevates the strategic threat to the United States.
8. Collapse of United States–Mexico Security Cooperation
DEA operations in Mexico remain severely restricted. DOJ testimony documents a sustained decline in cooperation since 2020. The CDC reported more than seventy-five thousand fentanyl-related deaths in 2023 (CDC, 2023). These conditions increase pressure for unilateral U.S. action.
AMLO’s renewed influence and Sheinbaum’s limited autonomy reduce the likelihood of meaningful cooperation. Criminal organizations benefit and expand their operational freedom.
9. Strategic Assessment
Mexico faces converging crises. Criminal organizations control unprecedented territory. Institutions are weakened. AMLO operates as an informal authority center whose behavior strengthens a political structure that benefits organizations designated as terrorist groups.
Cultural factors intensify these structural weaknesses. Caudillo dynamics thrive where authority is personalized, and institutions are fragile. AMLO embodies this model. His reactivation destabilizes governance and deepens the collapse of security cooperation.
This dynamic poses a direct threat to U.S. national security. The United States must evaluate whether continued tolerance of this hybrid political criminal system is strategically acceptable.
10. Conclusion
Mexico is entering a period of profound crisis. AMLO’s reactivation strengthens criminal networks, reduces Sheinbaum’s autonomy, and accelerates institutional erosion. Criminal organizations with terrorist designations now operate in an increasingly permissive environment.
The United States must determine whether it has the political will and operational capacity to confront these organizations and the political structures that protect them. The legal framework for decisive action exists. The question is whether Washington will use it at a moment when AMLO is reasserting power as a destabilizing force whose influence deepens Mexico’s crisis and increases risks to the United States.
References
Ahmed, A., & Semple, K. (2024, January 30). United States officials investigated alleged cartel ties to Mexico’s president. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/world/americas/amlo-mexico-cartels.html
Associated Press. (2025, December 3). Mexican President Sheinbaum’s legal adviser is selected as the new attorney general. AP News.
https://apnews.com/article/661b9bd974ca9f4e5879883bf05fc8f2
Bloomberg. (2025, November 28). Sheinbaum pushes attorney general out amid fuel smuggling probe. Bloomberg.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2023). Drug overdose deaths involving fentanyl: United States 2022 to 2023. CDC.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2023/20231122.htm
CIDE. (2023). Atlas de la Seguridad y la Defensa. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.
El País. (2025, November 29). Todos los caminos llevan a Godoy a la Fiscalía de México. El País.
https://elpais.com/mexico/2025-11-29/todos-los-caminos-llevan-a-godoy-a-la-fiscalia-de-mexico.html
El Universal. (2024). Quién era Carlos Manzo, político asesinado en Tehuantepec. El Universal.
InSight Crime. (2023). Mexico: Organized crime country profile.
https://insightcrime.org/countries/mexico
Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2023). Tyranny of the minority. Crown.
Miller, D. (2024, January 30). A cartel, a candidate, and the DEA. ProPublica.
https://www.propublica.org/article/mexico-cartel-money-amlo-campaign
Reuters. (2025, November 27). Mexican Attorney General Alejandro Gertz submits resignation. Reuters.
Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública. (2023). Incidencia delictiva.
United States Department of Justice. (2021–2024). Testimony to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee.
United States Department of the Treasury. (2025). Specially designated global terrorist listings. Office of Foreign Assets Control.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions
Wilson Center. (2025, March). United States designates Mexican cartels as FTOs. Wilson Center Commentary.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-designates-mexican-cartels-ftos
Weyland, K. (2020). Populism’s threat to democracy. Perspectives on Politics, 18(2), 389–406.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).