08 Jul BRICS as an Ideological Weapon: Latin American Radicalism and the Re-legitimization of Terrorism
By,
Jesús Romero. Co-Founder & Senior Fellow, MSI²
Introduction
What began as an emerging economic bloc —BRICS—has transformed into an ideological platform for certain Latin American governments to promote radical and confrontational narratives.
In its 2025 summit held in Brasília, the forum became a stage for anti-Israeli discourse by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ambiguous statements on Islamist terrorism, and a complicit silence toward actors such as Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
Latin America is no stranger to Islamist terrorism. The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires —which together killed over 100 people— were attributed to Hezbollah with logistical support from Iran. Nevertheless, several governments in the region have tightened ties with Tehran, ignoring this violent legacy.
While this trend does not represent all of the Latin American left, it does reveal an ideological current that has embraced Iran’s anti-Western narrative and projected it onto multilateral forums.
II. Iran and Latin America: An Ideological and Logistical Expansion
The Tehran-Caracas relationship was cemented under Hugo Chávez and deepened under Nicolás Maduro. In June 2022, both nations signed a 20-year cooperation plan covering oil, petrochemicals, defense, agriculture, and culture. The agreement also includes technical assistance for Venezuela’s energy sector and regular flights between Caracas and Tehran (Reuters, 2022).
Iran has also set up drone factories in Venezuela, transferred missile boats of Iranian design —used by Venezuela to threaten Guyana— and deployed military advisors to retrain Venezuelan F-16 crews. Iranian technicians have worked in Venezuelan refineries such as El Palito and Amuay.
In February 2023, the Lula administration authorized the Iranian warships IRIS Dena and IRIS Makran to dock at the port of Rio de Janeiro, defying U.S. warnings about Iran’s ties to terrorism and proliferation (Reuters, 2023).
III. Symbolic Support and Discursive Complicity with Hamas and Hezbollah
Venezuela and Nicaragua have openly expressed support for Hamas, calling its attacks “legitimate resistance.” Lula, for his part, has avoided condemning Hamas directly and described Israel’s actions in Gaza as “genocide.” These positions omit the responsibility of terrorist groups for attacks on civilians and their use of humanitarian infrastructure for military purposes.
This failure to deliver firm, balanced condemnation symbolically legitimizes extremist organizations and promotes a narrative that justifies violence as a tool of political struggle.
IV. Strategic Risks for Latin America
Iranian penetration in Latin America represents a multi-layered strategic threat:
- Regional Militarization: Iranian drones, military advisors, and defense technology challenge hemispheric stability.
- Normalization of the Iranian Regime: Naval visits and diplomatic exchanges provide legitimacy to a regime sanctioned for terrorism.
- Deterioration of Hemispheric Relations: Brazil and Venezuela face increased tensions with the United States and the EU over their ties to Tehran.
- Expansion of Illicit Networks: Hezbollah continues to operate money laundering, smuggling, and terrorist financing operations in the region, particularly in the Tri-Border Area, as evidenced by the “Project Cassandra” investigation (DEA, 2016).
V. SOUTHCOM and U.S. Congressional Warnings
The commanders of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have warned Congress about Iran’s expanding presence in the region. General Laura J. Richardson (2024) and Admiral Alvin Holsey (2025) testified that Iran seeks to consolidate strategic alliances with authoritarian governments to establish logistical, diplomatic, and operational footholds in the Western Hemisphere (SOUTHCOM, 2024; SOUTHCOM, 2025).
In parallel, the U.S. Congress introduced legislation (S.842 — No Hezbollah in Our Hemisphere Act) to curtail Hezbollah’s activities and block its financing through transnational criminal networks (U.S. Senate, 2025).
VI. Conclusion and Strategic Recommendations
Iran’s relationship with certain Latin American governments is not diplomatic neutrality —it is an active re-legitimization of a regime sanctioned for terrorism, with tangible consequences for regional security.
Recommendations
- Incorporate democratic and transparency requirements in the BRICS and CELAC mechanisms.
- Strengthen regional counterterrorism cooperation, especially in the Tri-Border Area.
- Establish institutional constraints on agreements with terrorism-sanctioned states.
- Promote a coherent diplomatic narrative that distinguishes legitimate political alignment from complicity with violent extremism.
References
DEA. (2016, February 1). DEA and European authorities uncover massive Hizballah drug and money laundering scheme. https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2016/02/01/dea-and-european-authorities-uncover-massive-hizballah-drug-and-money
Reuters. (2022, June 11). Iran and Venezuela sign 20-year cooperation plan. https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-venezuela-sign-20-year-cooperation-plan-state-tv-2022-06-11/
Reuters. (2023, February 27). Brazil allows two Iranian warships to dock in Rio despite U.S. pressure. https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-allows-two-iranian-warships-dock-rio-despite-us-pressure-2023-02-27/
U.S. Department of Defense. (2025, February 13). Posture of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee [Adm. Alvin Holsey]. https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/SOUTHCOMs-2025-Posture-Statement-to-Congress/
U.S. Senate. (2025). S.842 – No Hezbollah in Our Hemisphere Act. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61416
U.S. Southern Command. (2024, March 12). SOUTHCOM Posture Statement to Congress [Gen. Laura J. Richardson]. https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/SOUTHCOMs-2024-Posture-Statement-to-Congress/
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²). i Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).