14 Dec China Reveals the Strategy Behind Its New World Order
By,
Verioska Velasco, Senior Fellow, MSI²
In the “Document on China’s Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean,” published on December 10, 2025, China openly reveals its strategic intentions on a global scale.
The document refers to a “global governance initiative,” emphasizing that it seeks to promote a change in the international system centered on the United Nations, increasing the “representation and voice of the Global South” as a structural shift aimed at achieving a “more just and reasonable global governance.” What is striking is that this strategy, which claims to pursue global equality, does not align with China’s internal reality. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2022), China exhibits a systematic absence of fundamental freedoms, including the lack of an independent civil society and the absence of freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion.
The document also refers to a “global economic governance initiative” and clearly expresses China’s interest in increasing its influence through Latin American central banks and in deepening the leverage of these institutions, as well as that of multilateral economic and financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
China’s strategy seeks to promote changes to global economic and financial rules and to the structure that governs the International Monetary Fund. The document explicitly states the intention to “start everything anew by abandoning what currently exists.” China claims to “reject unilateral acts of bullying” and clearly warns that it will promote an economic globalization guided toward a “correct direction,” without specifying what that direction entails.
De-dollarization continues to be an objective of mainland China. The document states that the strategy is to “strengthen dialogue and cooperation between central banks and financial regulatory authorities on both sides to facilitate cross-border settlement in local currencies, negotiate RMB clearing, and steadily promote monetary cooperation, such as local currency swap arrangements.” RMB is the abbreviation for renminbi, the official legal tender of the People’s Republic of China.
China seeks greater influence over nuclear energy in Latin American countries, while also focusing on the exploitation of mineral resources and traditional energy sectors such as oil and natural gas, with the promise of long-term payment using local currency. Among the greatest risks of allowing a country such as mainland China to wield power and control over Latin American nuclear energy, it has been warned that “the expansion of critical infrastructure projects, including nuclear ones, by China through the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] in Latin America raises concerns about recipient countries’ vulnerability to political coercion and the establishment of Chinese technological standards in strategic regions” (Blanchard & Rivas, 2023).
China’s ambitions extend beyond nuclear energy. It seeks to form a partnership with Latin American countries to coordinate joint strategies on biological and chemical weapons.
As if that were not enough, the document also refers to military exchanges between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, including military operations, visits by naval vessels, personnel training, and “UN peacekeeping.” In a 28-page document, the United Nations is mentioned ten times, underscoring China’s strategic interest in expanding its influence within the multilateral organization by “implementing UN General Assembly resolutions and promoting global dialogue.”
Curiously, the document refers to providing “practical cooperation in the repatriation of fugitives and the recovery of stolen funds.” A practical example: if, for the regime of Nicolás Maduro, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado is considered a “fugitive,” as she was described by the Venezuelan attorney general, could this translate into China contributing to her repatriation?
According to Human Rights Watch (2025), China’s current authorities “have intensified repression nationwide, including the persecution of human rights defenders and individuals perceived as critical.” What guarantees and risks exist for Latin American citizens, victims of authoritarian governments, that China will not become an enforcement arm for human rights violations carried out by its regional counterparts?
China’s objective is the construction of a “cooperative cyberspace,” promoting new international norms to establish a “multilateral, democratic, and transparent system of internet governance.” The document indicates that the intention is to establish a system that will control the internet and to use the United Nations to promote “a community with a shared future in cyberspace.” It explicitly states that the goal is to “oppose cyber hegemony and the use of the internet to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.” Ironically, mainland China, a country widely criticized for its lack of freedoms, seeks to cooperate in building a democratic internet.
According to Human Rights Watch (2025), in mainland China, there is no freedom of expression, association, assembly, or religion; nevertheless, China’s strategy in Latin America promotes “joint program development, reciprocal participation in press, publishing, radio, film, and television fairs or exhibitions (…) and academic exchanges between think tanks.”
The document clearly states that all these relationships with Latin American countries are only possible on the basis of the One China principle, opposing any expression that suggests “Taiwan independence.”
Conclusions
China’s strategic document toward Latin America reveals an explicit desire to establish a new world order. Paradoxically, a regime consistently accused of serious human rights violations and lacking fundamental freedoms at home seeks to lead a “more just global governance” and a “democratic internet.”
For Latin America, this plan represents serious risks. Expanding China’s influence within the United Nations appears tailor-made for a far more ambitious project that encompasses control over multilateral financial institutions, natural resources, nuclear energy, and the communications narrative, ultimately aiming to position Latin America against the United States.
China’s strategy is clear: to use the region as a testing ground for an alternative global model to the Western one, with the United Nations serving as its platform. Latin American countries, and especially their leaders, are at a critical historical moment in which they must weigh short-term benefits and particular interests against the defense of sovereignty and the fundamental rights of their citizens.
References
Blanchard, J. F., & Rivas, R. (2023). Chinese investment in Latin America: Geopolitical risk. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-investment-latin-america-geopolitical-risk
Human Rights Watch. (2025). Informe mundial 2025: China. https://www.hrw.org/es/world-report/2025/country-chapters/china
Jara A., R. (2025, December 6). Confirman la asistencia de María Corina Machado a la ceremonia de entrega del Nobel de la Paz. Emol. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Internacional/2025/12/06/1185192/machado-asistencia-ceremonia-nobel-paz.html
Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos. (2022). OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region
Xinhua News Agency. (2025, December 10). Documento sobre la política de China hacia América Latina y el Caribe. https://spanish.xinhuanet.com/20251210/e2dec9c6d13b4802919c7a7d87b0ecb5/c.html
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).