22 Mar Colombia’s Drug Conflict: Unraveling the ELN and Mexican Cartel Relations

By,

William Acosta, SME, MSI2

Jesús Daniel Romero, Senior Fellow, MSI2

This report analyzes the recent remarks made by Colombian President Gustavo Petro regarding the relationship between the Sinaloa Cartel and the National Liberation Army (ELN). It evaluates the implications of these statements on the operational dynamics of drug trafficking in Colombia, the autonomy of local armed groups, and the challenges faced by foreign cartels, particularly Mexican ones. The findings suggest that, while alliances exist, Colombian organizations retain significant autonomy, complicating the narrative of subordination posited by President Petro. Furthermore, there are concerns that President Petro’s claims may serve as a strategy to deflect blame from the shortcomings of his “Total Peace” policy, which has faced significant criticism.

Introduction

In early February, President Gustavo Petro made grave accusations against the ELN, suggesting that this guerrilla group operates under the orders of the Sinaloa Cartel and supplies it with cocaine. In a speech at the Universidad Industrial de Santander (UIS) in Bucaramanga, Petro claimed that the Sinaloa Cartel is the “current boss” of the ELN, implying a deep connection between guerrilla activities and drug trafficking. This assertion comes amid escalating violence in regions such as Catatumbo, where the ELN has intensified its offensive against FARC dissidents. This report seeks to critically assess these claims and the realities of the drug trafficking landscape in Colombia.

Key Findings

Remarks by President Gustavo Petro indicate a potential misunderstanding of the operational dynamics between the Sinaloa Cartel and the ELN. The claim lacks substantiated evidence and overlooks the historical context of the ELN’s autonomy. According to President Petro, the ELN operates under the control of the Sinaloa Cartel, suggesting that its leaders are now Mexican drug traffickers who purchase cocaine produced in Colombia. Petro indicated that the cartel finances and coordinates the activities of the ELN, establishing a link that involves an exchange of cocaine for specialized weaponry.

Petro emphasized the necessity of education as a means to prevent youth from engaging in violence and criminal activities influenced by foreign cartels. This approach could serve as a long-term strategy to undermine the recruitment efforts of armed groups in regions like Catatumbo. The recent spike in violence resulting from the ELN’s offensive has displaced over 54,000 individuals, highlighting the urgent need for effective conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance in the region. Reports indicate that the ELN’s actions have resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

In addition to the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is also present in Colombia, complicating the security situation further. Both cartels collaborate with Organized Armed Groups (GAO) in the production and distribution of cocaine. An intelligence report from the National Army revealed that at least 80 ELN guerrillas, including minors, have crossed into Venezuela to strengthen their operations in Catatumbo. This movement indicates an intensification of guerrilla activity in the border area, which has become a focus of instability.

Geographical and sociopolitical factors hinder Mexican cartels from establishing permanent bases in Colombia, necessitating partnerships with local groups to operate effectively. Colombian criminal organizations have successfully collaborated with Mexican cartels while maintaining territorial control. This dynamic suggests a balanced partnership rather than a subordinate relationship. Partnerships with local armed actors, including the ELN, AGC, and FARC dissidents, enable Mexican cartels to secure cocaine trafficking routes to Caribbean ports, facilitating exports to North America and Europe.

As Mexican cartels gain access to cocaine production, Colombian groups retain territorial control, operating according to their interests and preserving autonomy. Despite the financial might of Mexican cartels, their ability to operate independently in Colombia is significantly constrained by the hostile environment. Petro emphasized the importance of education to prevent the recruitment of youth by illegal armed groups. He noted that these groups are increasingly recruiting young people to carry out violent acts, presenting a significant threat to the country’s future.

Structure and Operations of the ELN

The ELN operates primarily in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Arauca, Sur de Bolívar, Antioquia (Bajo Cauca region), Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño, with occasional presence in Boyacá, Casanare, and southern Cesar. The group also has a presence in Colombia’s six major cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, and Cúcuta.

The Central Command (COCE) consists of five commanders responsible for leadership of the ELN, political work, military area, national general staff leadership, representation and international issues, and financial matters and links with military fronts. Manuel Pérez Martínez, alias “El Cura Pérez,” led the COCE from 1973 until his death in 1998. Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias “Gabino,” took over after Pérez and restructured the Central Command. The current composition of COCE includes Eliécer Chamorro Acosta, alias “Antonio García,” as Commander-in-Chief; Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias “Pablo Beltrán,” as Political Leader; Rafael Sierra Granados, alias “Ramiro Vargas,” responsible for international relations; Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía, alias “Pablito,” managing communications and drug trafficking along the Venezuela border; and Jaime Galvis Rivera, alias “Ariel” or “Lorenzo Alcantuz.”

Former COCE members include Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias “Gabino,” who resigned in 2021 due to health issues; Pedro Cañas Serrano, alias “Óscar Santos,” who is deceased; Carlos Arturo Velandia, alias “Felipe Torres,” who was captured in 1994; and Gerardo Bermúdez, alias “Francisco Galán,” also captured in 1994. The Dirección Nacional (DINAL) was established in 1982 with three members from existing fronts and expanded to nine members in 1983, including fronts of war, the National Finance Commission, the National General Staff, and the National Logistics Commission. Its leader, alias “Gallero,” was killed by authorities in 2020.

The ELN has seven military fronts and one National Urban Front, subdivided into 29 rural fronts and 22 mobile companies. Rural fronts are organized into columns, companies, detachments, squads, and triads. Popular militias operate in a decentralized manner, carrying out logistical tasks. The Colombian government has reported the presence of the ELN in Venezuela, supported by investigations indicating links and operations in that country.

Underlying Factors Influencing Dynamics

Colombia’s legacy of violence and armed conflict has entrenched illicit activities in society. The dissolution of FARC in 2016 created a power vacuum filled by groups like the ELN. The lucrative cocaine trade incentivizes both local and foreign actors, while high poverty and unemployment levels facilitate recruitment for armed groups. The production of cocaine and coca has a direct correlation with death, further complicating the socio-economic landscape.

U.S. drug policies aimed at eradication often lead to increased violence and displacement, impacting the operational landscape for both Colombian and Mexican groups. Armed groups may receive support from local communities, complicating efforts to combat their influence. Economic incentives drive youth recruitment into these organizations. Corruption and weak governance hinder effective law enforcement, allowing criminal organizations to thrive. Limitations in the judicial system also impact prosecution efforts.

The global demand for cocaine fuels Colombia’s critical role in the drug trade, necessitating collaboration across borders to address organized crime. Counterinsurgency strategies by the Colombian government can lead to escalated violence, further entrenching armed groups in local communities.

Involvement of the Cartel de los Soles and the Nicolás Maduro Regime with the ELN

The involvement of the Cartel de los Soles and the Nicolás Maduro regime with the National Liberation Army (ELN) represents a significant aspect of the current geopolitical and security dynamics in Colombia and Venezuela. This collaboration highlights the interconnections between state power, organized crime, and guerrilla warfare in the region.

The Cartel de los Soles refers to a group of high-ranking Venezuelan military officials and government leaders allegedly involved in drug trafficking. This group has established a strategic alliance with the ELN and Mexican cartels. This partnership has evolved over the years and is characterized by mutual benefits facilitating worldwide operations.

The Cartel de los Soles reportedly collaborates with the ELN to control drug trafficking routes, particularly in regions bordering Colombia. This partnership enables the ELN to gain access to resources and protection while allowing Venezuelan officials to profit from the lucrative cocaine trade. The Nicolás Maduro regime has provided the ELN with political and military support, viewing the group as a useful ally in maintaining control over areas that may otherwise be influenced by Colombian state forces. This support includes facilitating the ELN’s operations in Venezuela and protecting its members from extradition to Colombia.

Both the ELN and the Maduro regime share common objectives in terms of resisting U.S. influence in the region. They have positioned themselves as opponents of U.S. policies, which they view as imperialistic, thus fostering a sense of solidarity in their struggle against perceived external threats. The ELN has established a significant operational presence in Venezuela, where it has been able to recruit fighters, train members, and coordinate drug trafficking activities with the Cartel de los Soles. This operational base has allowed the group to expand its influence beyond Colombian borders.

The collaboration between the ELN and the Maduro regime has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region. Increased violence, displacement, and criminal activities have affected local populations, particularly in border areas where both entities operate. The relationship between the Cartel de los Soles, the ELN, and the Maduro regime has raised concerns among international observers regarding the stability of the region. The involvement of state actors in drug trafficking and guerrilla warfare complicates efforts to address these issues through traditional diplomatic and military means.

Shifting the Narrative: Why President Petro Wants to Redirect Attention

The ELN is expanding under his watch. Since Petro took office, the ELN has gained strength, taking control of strategic territories in Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. His government’s peace talks with the ELN have led to ceasefires that effectively allow the group to regroup and expand. The Sinaloa Cartel is a convenient scapegoat. This cartel operates internationally and is already a major U.S. national security concern. By highlighting the Sinaloa Cartel, Petro can align himself with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts while avoiding scrutiny of the ELN’s growth. However, coca cultivation and cocaine production remain a major concern for Petro’s political existence and Colombia’s partnership in disruption.

The ELN has political and ideological ties to Petro’s base. The group has historical ties to Marxist-Leninist movements and shares ideological similarities with Petro’s leftist policies. Cracking down on the ELN would alienate factions within his political base and disrupt his peace negotiation agenda. Venezuela’s role in protecting the ELN is significant. The Maduro regime in Venezuela actively supports and shelters the ELN, allowing it to operate freely across the border. Petro maintains diplomatic ties with Maduro, meaning he has little incentive to confront the ELN’s cross-border operations.

Reality Check: The ELN Is a Bigger Threat in the Region

The ELN now controls entire cocaine production and trafficking networks, working with Mexican cartels rather than just taxing them. The group is also growing in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Central America, making it a rising transnational threat. While the Sinaloa Cartel is focused on drug trafficking, the ELN also engages in terrorism, extortion, and political insurgency, making it an even greater long-term threat to Colombia’s stability.

Conclusion

The situation involving Colombian armed groups and Mexican cartels is multifaceted, driven by a combination of historical grievances, economic incentives, social conditions, and geopolitical realities. The collaboration between the Cartel de los Soles and the Nicolás Maduro regime with the ELN underscores the complex interplay of organized crime, state power, and guerrilla warfare in Colombia and Venezuela. This alliance enhances the operational capabilities of the ELN and poses significant challenges to regional stability and security, contributing to ongoing humanitarian crises in affected areas. Addressing these intertwined issues requires coordinated efforts from both national and international actors to dismantle these networks and mitigate their impact on local communities. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective strategies to combat organized crime and enhance regional security, thereby promoting sustainable peace in Colombia. The challenges posed by violence, recruitment, and governance require comprehensive policies that address both immediate humanitarian needs and long-term structural issues.

References

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