05 Nov Ecuador on Edge: A Nation at the Crossroads of Security and Sovereignty
By,
CDR José Adán Gutiérrez, USN (Ret.), Senior Fellow, MSI²
LTC Octavio Pérez, US Army (Ret.), Co-Founder and Senior Fellow, MSI²
Dr Rafael Marrero, Chief Economist & Founder, MSI²
This is the first article in a three-part series by the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²). The series examines Ecuador’s fragile balance between security, sovereignty, and outside influence in the context of renewed U.S.–China competition in the Western Hemisphere.
The Referendum That Will Define a Generation
In November 2025, Ecuadorians will cast a national vote whose outcome reaches far beyond the ballot box. The question on the table asks whether the country should approve a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would permit a U.S. security presence at Manta Air Base. The decision is not merely about military logistics—it touches on identity, alliances, and the nation’s strategic future.
Ecuador can choose to re-anchor its partnership with Washington and the broader democratic community, or it can choose to remain more deeply under Beijing’s economic shadow. The vote is a moment of truth: a chance to decide how Ecuador defines sovereignty in an increasingly perilous world.
A Trusted Ally, Then a Break
For much of the twentieth century, Ecuador worked closely with the United States. During World War II, the U.S. built Base Beta in the Galápagos Islands to monitor Axis submarine activity near the Panama Canal. Ecuador supplied vital raw materials: balsa wood and natural rubber, and joined the hemispheric security effort.
In 1950, the U.S. Department of State declared that Washington’s policy was “to foster these tendencies by aiding the Ecuadoran Government to raise educational standards … to improve governmental administration … and to raise the living standards of the people” (U.S. Department of State, 1950).
Through the Cold War, cooperation deepened through joint training and advisory programs. The partnership was pragmatic and rooted in mutual respect, not coercion.
That pattern collapsed in the 2000s under left-leaning governments beginning with Rafael Correa. Foreign policy was recast around populist narratives and anti-U.S. rhetoric. The government closed the Forward Operating Location at Manta in 2008, expelled U.S. counter-narcotics personnel, and later shut down the Security Cooperation Office. Doors that had been open for decades were locked in a single political cycle (Ikeda, 2018).
The Space China Stepped Into
The vacuum did not last. Beijing entered the scene with loans, long-dated contracts, and turnkey infrastructure projects. The offers looked generous on the surface, but the fine print undercut autonomy.
Starting in 2009, Chinese state-owned firms secured long-term positions in Ecuador’s core energy assets: the Sacha oilfield and other sites in Sucumbíos and Orellana, plus offshore gas fields at Amistad. Oil-backed repayment schemes stretched over years and tied production to debt service. Telecommunications, power grids, and surveillance systems followed. What began as financing turned into leverage over strategic decision-making.
As LTC Octavio Pérez notes, the pattern resembles dependency. China finances projects, brings in its own companies, and captures the value chain. The result is economic influence that penetrates data systems and public infrastructure. It is not ordinary trade—it reaches into the state itself (ConstitutionNet, 2025).
Consequences of Closing the Door to the U.S.
The end of the U.S. presence at Manta carried a heavy price. Over the next decade, violence surged along the coast and through the ports. Intelligence sharing and joint interdictions diminished. Transnational criminal groups moved in. By 2024, Ecuador had the highest homicide rate in South America. Corruption spread through the judiciary, and extortion became commonplace in several provinces.
At the same time, oil-for-debt arrangements with China deepened Ecuador’s fiscal bind. Contract “renegotiations” extended repayment schedules instead of restoring independence. Many Ecuadorians concluded that rejecting Washington had not produced autonomy; it had simply rearranged dependency.
A Hard Turn Back to Security
Crisis produced clarity. In January 2024, President Daniel Noboa declared an internal armed conflict and designated 22 criminal organizations as terrorist groups. The United States quietly increased assistance. Joint operations along the Colombian border disrupted the Tren de Aragua network. U.S. Air National Guard C-130 missions moved troops and cargo, restoring mobility and operational reach. Trust began to rebuild through results, not speeches (U.S. Embassy in Quito, 2025).
These steps reopened the debate on a new SOFA. Unlike the 1999–2008 lease, a formal agreement would establish legal protections, host-nation oversight, and continuity across administrations. It would not erase sovereignty; it would codify it.
The November Choice: Security With Safeguards
The referendum now asks the nation to approve the return of a U.S. presence at Manta under a SOFA framework. Supporters emphasize tangible benefits:
• Restore aerial surveillance and maritime monitoring in the eastern Pacific.
• Strengthen counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism capacity.
• Improve disaster-response readiness for earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis.
• Create jobs and stimulate investment in Manabí Province.
• Signal to external powers that Ecuador stands with the democratic hemisphere.
Opponents claim any foreign base diminishes sovereignty. That concern deserves a direct answer. Sovereignty depends on the state’s ability to enforce the law, secure borders, and protect its people. It shrinks when criminal groups outgun police forces and when national assets are mortgaged to opaque creditors. As Dr. Marrero has observed, sovereignty without security is an illusion.
Why Manta Matters to Both Countries
Ecuador’s November 2025 referendum could mark a decisive return to a strategic partnership with the United States. Among its provisions is the possible reactivation of the former U.S. Forward Operating Location in Manta. A move that would restore Ecuador’s role in regional maritime security. Manta occupies a strategic position along the Pacific sea lanes that lead toward the Panama Canal, serving as a southern node for monitoring and securing the wider maritime commons. From this vantage point, Ecuador can once again help safeguard hemispheric trade routes, counter transnational crime, and deter the growing presence of extra-hemispheric powers in nearby waters.
For Ecuador, it is a force multiplier against cartels, cyber intrusions, and coercive finance. A renewed U.S. presence would deter trafficking in the eastern Pacific and complicate Chinese and Russian efforts to expand regional security footprints. It would also reassure investors who see stability as a prerequisite for growth.
Professional military analysis has reached similar conclusions: closing Manta removed a layer of deterrence and cooperation, while reopening it would restore capacity that paperwork cannot replace (Garay-Briones, 2025).
Ecuador’s Test
Ecuador stands before a defining decision. The country can anchor its security and economy in transparent alliances or continue under arrangements crafted elsewhere. Security, prosperity, and freedom rise together; or they collapse together.
The November referendum will show whether Ecuador is prepared to rebuild trust with an old ally and place limits on predatory dependencies. Other nations are watching for proof that such dependency is not destiny.
The question is simple: Will Ecuadorians choose to live under Beijing’s leverage, or stand with partners who link sovereignty to liberty and the rule of law? History warns, but it also grants second chances to nations that act with courage.
References
ConstitutionNet. (2025, June 23). Constitutional Implications of Allowing Foreign Military Bases: Ecuador. https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/sovereignty-reimagined-constitutional-implications-allowing-foreign-military-bases-ecuador
Garay-Briones, A. I. (2025, September). A U.S. Air Base in Ecuador: Strategic and Security Benefits for the U.S.–Ecuador Relationship. Military Review Online Exclusive. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Online-Exclusive/2025/US-Base-Ecuador/US-Base-Ecuador-UA1.pdf
Ikeda, A. (2018). Exploring a civil resistance approach to examining U.S. military base politics: The case of Manta, Ecuador. MARLAS, 2(1). https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/202-481-1-SM.pdf
U.S. Department of State. (1950, October 2). United States policy toward Ecuador (Document 442). In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II (pp. 857–862). Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v02/ch18subch1
U.S. Embassy in Quito. (2025, January 6). The United States Strengthened Its Alliance with Ecuador to Bolster Security in 2024. https://ec.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-strengthened-its-alliance-with-ecuador-to-bolster-security-in-2024/
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).