Monómeros: From Warning to Confirmation
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Monómeros: From Warning to Confirmation

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The Monómeros case proves that our warning from November 2024 was not speculation but an accurate diagnosis


What We Said in November 2024

In the article published on November 26, 2024, in FinGuru, we stated:

“The sale of Monómeros has been driven by the Nicolás Maduro regime, which seeks to dispose of assets before the inauguration of President Donald Trump in the United States in January 2025. The Venezuelan regime would be concerned about possible intervention by the future Trump administration through sanctions that would severely affect the company.” (Romero & Acosta, 2024, p. 2)

We also warned:

“The United States would be part of any negotiation regarding the future of this company.” (Romero & Acosta, 2024, p. 5)

Our hypothesis was clear at the time: Maduro would seek to monetize Monómeros as part of a strategy for economic survival before a tightening of U.S. sanctions.

What is Happening in August 2025

Nine months later, events confirm our predictions:

– July 25, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization, naming Nicolás Maduro as its leader.
– Colombian President Gustavo Petro publicly backed Maduro after the designation and threatened the U.S. Attorney General responsible for its publication.
– During the VII CELAC Energy Ministers Meeting, Petro and Maduro:
• Signed a confidentiality agreement to open Monómeros’ financial records.
• Agreed on a roadmap to sell the company to Colombia, with Ecopetrol as the state buyer.
• Began steps to obtain a special OFAC license, a legal requirement due to existing sanctions.

Since 2017, Monómeros has operated under sanctions from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), as it is considered a subsidiary of PEQUIVEN, part of the Maduro regime’s economic structure. According to OFAC’s general license, the company could continue certain financial operations, but that authorization expires in June 2025, with no guarantee of renewal under the new U.S. administration (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2019).

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Petro’s Contradiction

July 28, 2024 – Elections in Venezuela
After the presidential elections, Gustavo Petro declared that he would not recognize Nicolás Maduro’s victory without verifiable records:
“Neither Colombia nor Brazil will recognize Maduro if he does not present the electoral records” (El País, September 26, 2024)

July 25, 2025 – SDGT Designation
After the U.S. designated Maduro as the leader of the Cartel de los Soles, Petro publicly backed the Venezuelan leader and threatened the U.S. Attorney General who authorized the designation’s publication.

Conclusion: Petro went from conditioning the bilateral relationship on electoral legitimacy in 2024 to strengthening political and economic cooperation with a leader accused of narcoterrorism in 2025.

The Strategic Reason Behind the Sale of Monómeros

Although publicly presented as an economic agreement to secure fertilizers for Colombia, the sale of Monómeros has a deeper political and geostrategic background:

1. Immediate financing for Maduro: Turning a sanctioned asset into cash or economic benefits right after his designation as leader of the Cartel de los Soles.
2. Shielding the asset in the hands of an ally: By transferring ownership to Ecopetrol, a state-owned company in a U.S.-allied country, the asset could be less exposed to additional sanctions.
3. Consolidation of the Petro–Maduro axis: The sale within the framework of CELAC strengthens a political alliance that openly challenges Washington.
4. Challenge to the U.S. sanctions regime: If the U.S. does not block the operation, it will send a message to other governments that it is possible to break the financial isolation of a leader sanctioned for narcoterrorism.


In this context, the sale is not an isolated move but a key piece in a political and financial survival strategy for the Maduro regime, with the direct support of President Petro.

Washington Must Block This Sale

This sale is not a simple agricultural business: it is a financing mechanism for a regime sanctioned for narcoterrorism.



Allowing the operation would mean:
– Providing liquidity to an actor designated as a terrorist.
– Undermining the credibility of the U.S. sanctions regime.
– Accepting the political alignment of an allied government (Colombia) with a criminalized regime.

In this scenario, blocking the sale is a strategic obligation for Washington.

It must also be a direct message to President Gustavo Petro: Washington will not tolerate an allied country facilitating resources to a leader designated as the head of a global terrorist organization.

Conclusion

At MSI², we maintain that prospective analysis is key to anticipating threats and strategic moves. The Monómeros case proves that our warning from November 2024 was not speculation but an accurate diagnosis.

Final Warning

If Washington allows this sale to proceed, it will send the message that an ally can finance a cartel leader and global terrorist without consequences. The Monómeros case will be remembered not as a commercial transaction, but as the time the United States allowed a friendly government to support a narcoterrorist regime in the Western Hemisphere.


References

Romero, J. D., & Acosta, W. (2024, November 26). Monómeros at the Crossroads: The sale, a litmus test for the second Trump administration? FinGuru. https://fin.guru/es/politica-y-sociedad/monomers-at-the-crossroads-of-sales-a-litmus-test-for-trumps-second-administration-bscyfc48wa

U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2019, April 12). Venezuela-related sanctions regulations: Addition of Monómeros Colombo Venezolanos S.A. Office of Foreign Assets Control. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20190412 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).