03 Aug SITREP: Are we getting ready for a blockade of Taiwan, much like the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962?
By,
Octavio Perez, Senior Fellow | MSI2
Could the blockade start as a Quarantine? Or will it be a full-blown invasion?
Much has been written since CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) published and war-gamed their assessment in 2023 about a potential attempt to invade Taiwan in 2026-2027. For the last three years, China has been conducting war games and live-fire exercises in and around Taiwan.
Most notably, the previous two exercises in 2024 (Joint Sword 2024-1 and Joint Sword 2024-2) and the one just held early in 2025 (Strait Thunder 2025-1). As we get closer to the estimated date, we see an increase in activity and a continued rehearsal, just like in many other military operations in the past.
This article examines several studies done after the CSIS war game in 2023 and gives insights into the magnitude of this endeavor and what variables may be critical in the event of an attack. Finally, based on the indicators and warnings that have been studied and even regarded as key events, we can lean towards several scenarios, whether a full-scale invasion, a blockade, or quarantine could be either the initial or final goal.
Saddam Hussein’s Special Forces and key personnel had rehearsed secretly the invasion of Kuwait in 1989. Operation Thunderbolt (a.k.a. Operation Yonatan) in 1976 was also rehearsed before the final attack on Entebbe airport on July 03, 1976. In less than six days, the IDF and Israel’s special forces built a mock-up airport and rehearsed diligently their mission. So here you have two examples of military assaults: one with a year’s worth of planning and another within 6 days. At the same time, the Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has been rehearsing with real live fire exercises for years, and most intensely in the last three.
Is all this a deception operation? Intimidation? Infringing on Taiwan’s “Grey Zones” or territorial waters and airspace with significant increases in naval and air assets as the years go by, and provides significant targeting data for counter-battery fire, it also prepares both sides for a conflict.
So, if we see a continued pattern that seems to build up to an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, we must also determine what indicators and warnings are associated with a potential invasion and not be caught up in a deception at both the strategic and operational levels.
We must also put in perspective what China must achieve and challenges it must overcome to accomplish this objective. A massive undertaking which will include risk, deception and speed with coordination and maneuver.
A quick review of the challenges of this undertaking that the Chinese must overcome to be successful. Regardless of the apparent close distance to the mainland, D-Day in Normandy 1944, Incheon in Korea 1950, and Desert Storm in Iraq 1991 all had an element of deception which proved to be a combat multiplier, saving lives, operational costs, and time.
A feint in war, a fundamental surprise. A deception to gain an advantage. Such as the 1st Cavalry Division did during Desert Storm in 1991 at Wadi al-Batin on the border between Iraq and Kuwait. For 11 days (13th-24th of February 1991), 1st Cav would enter Iraq every night, each day several kilometers deeper in search and destroy missions. All accompanied by an artillery prep that lasted a good hour plus, and the support of every artillery unit from 7th Corps as they moved their units into position to do the final attack. This created the perception that the main thrust would come through the Wadi (dry riverbed), and the enemy moved most of their artillery in that direction, as well as a couple of the Republican Guard divisions on their second echelon defense. A strategic ruse that we performed, unknown to the press until after we invaded. And the rest of the 7th Corps actually went in with the “Hail Mary” pass option, where units came in through the Western sector and encircled their forces.
Remember that all this posturing that China has been doing could also be part of the feint, the ruse, a deception that conveys a perceived amphibious landing operation. When in fact it could be all a deceptive move, and an alternative airborne or airmobile operation could be the actual invasion force. A blockade or quarantine is imposed while they continue to destroy government and military facilities until the surrender of the Taiwanese forces.
Quoting Ian Easton’s article Why a Taiwan Invasion Would Look Nothing Like D-Day, Ian’s analysis clearly identifies the vast differences between one and the other:
“…Unlike Normandy, the coastal terrain here is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are all bordered by cliffs and urban jungles…”
So, in his analysis, he makes it very clear that terrain, which consists of granite hills (honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems and the multitude of outlying islands apart from the mainland which are heavily guarded with missiles, rockets and artillery guns provide a very different scenario for an invading force than what Normandy D Day was.
He continues to explain how the main island’s rugged terrain with 258 peaks over 3,000 meters in elevation provides another challenge for continued defense and insurgencies after the initial attack. He reiterates that the coastal terrain here is a defender’s dream come true. He further goes over some unique constructions built for protection from earthquakes and typhoons, which ultimately serve as part of the defenses.
Ian’s Article, printed in May 2021, still stands true. He addresses Taiwan’s military peacetime strength of almost 190,000 and a large reserve force comprised primarily of recent conscripts that could assemble up to 450,000. It is estimated that 260,000 reservists could be mobilized in a worst-case scenario to augment active-duty personnel quickly.
Once you establish this premise, you must consider the factors that come into play and either exacerbate or complicate a large-scale amphibious assault.
You need to consider that there are so many other factors in play:
Time of reaction and mobilization of reserves, how fast can they respond to a national call-up, declaring a state of emergency, what weapon systems are already in place, what long-range missiles are part of the defenses that could interdict ships and landing crafts.
Technology and cyberspace are also important factors, as both countries are global leaders and have citizens living on both sides that also serve as potential (Humint operations) with sleeper cells or saboteurs.
Lessons from the Ukrainian-Russian War
The effectiveness of drones in the war between Ukraine and Russia will also be a factor in this engagement. Many lessons were learned from integrating drones in combat and the multitude of roles they play. The advent of lasers, sonic weapons, or what is now called directed energy weapons also comes into the mix.
The use of hypersonic missiles, which are sometimes extremely difficult to jam or use electronic countermeasures before impacting, is a new nuance on the battlefield, again a first use during the Ukrainian War.
A combat multiplier introduced recently: Harpoon missiles
In addition to CSIS experts, the war simulation was also attended by House Select Committee on the CCP Chairman John Moolenaar, Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi, and Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman Rob Wittman.
In April, Wittman was one of four U.S. representatives who sent a letter urging the House Appropriations Committee to allocate US$165 million to expedite the delivery of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.
The lawmakers said the missiles should be delivered within the “Davidson window,” a term referring to the 2021-2027 period when former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command head Admiral Phil Davidson believed a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be most likely.
Last year, Bloomberg reported that Taiwan had purchased 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles from the U.S., completing a deal that the U.S. Congress approved in 2020.
Taiwan’s Chinese-language Liberty Times reported in September that Taiwan had taken delivery of an unspecified number of Harpoon missiles, part of a total of 128 missiles and 32 launchers that will be delivered by the end of 2026.
And the key question always stands: when will the US react? Will they go at it alone? Will Japan and South Korea also help? Will that mean that Taiwan must go solo for a period? Until when will the allies react?
Overall Experience in combat on both sides
The PLA invaded Vietnam in 1979, for a period of 3 weeks and 6 days, when they launched a surprise border attack, held some cities, then withdrew. Pretty much an infantry assault on land 46 years ago, nothing to do with an amphibious operation. They also usually do not train in complex combined arms scenarios. So that integration has not been tested. But they are trying to test this out now with the recent exercises. The Taiwanese Armed Forces have trained with the US since 1980, and more intensely since 2023. Japan has also offered to train them. The United States maintained a Taiwan Defense Force from 1954 until April 1979.
Invading force
A key doctrinal ratio use for offensive combat operations is a minimum of 3:1 ratio between the attacking force and the defenders, and that even becomes more crucial given the geography, natural defenses and preparations of Taiwan, So, keeping the ratio of 3:1 PLA would have to amass upwards of 1.3 million troops to the estimated (450,000 defenders). Another daring challenge in the Straits of Taiwan. Once again, given the terrain and defense, this could climb to a 4:1 or 5:1 ratio.
Regardless of the extensive expansion of their fleet of ships and landing crafts, the congestion of traffic and potential use of decoys (other merchant fleet ships, tankers, tugs, fishing boats) would also present a coordination issue, given the magnitude of this operation when compared to the massive support fleet during D-Day.
No one questions China’s massive superiority of forces, and potential sustainment of an operation like this, but its capacity to execute violently with effectiveness in a short period of time. Although these last three years of wargaming have given them experience in maneuvering and positioning of forces it has never been under duress (being fired at) at the end experience is experience and you learn as you continuously rehearse and execute.
Once again, Taiwan’s geography, defense drills, and preparation will present a challenge for the great Chinese PLA. In order to achieve operational control of a beachhead or entry point (Airport) for airmobile operations, it must achieve this as well as air supremacy in order to protect the rest of the invading force floating on the Taiwan Strait. A failure to accomplish this would be very costly, and not being able to support the initial airborne air mobile assault could lead to failure or very high casualties.
Various estimates on the actual potential to insert, deploy amphibious troops to Taiwan range from 8,000 per day, and if you compare that to D-Day. The Normandy assault had over 131,000 troops per day, with an additional 24,000 paratroopers. Taiwan will also have mines, attack submarines deployed, as well as multiple air defense and coastal artillery in all those islands. A further helping hand from the US, Japan, and South Korea could even provide larger attrition rates of the invading force.
According to the CSIS estimate for a potential assault in 2026, they calculated an invasion force of approximately 96 ships and 305 landing crafts trips, we should expect subsequent amphibious waves to continually shrink. While aviation can rapidly move large troop volumes, it cannot compete with sealift for moving the “mountains of equipment and lakes of fuel” that China would need. Hence, China must secure seaports or else be dependent on shrinking volumes of additional equipment and supplies.
Securing seaports, of which there are 14 potential sites, will be a monumental challenge. Taiwan has had ample time to integrate the defenses with layers of mines, wave breakers, and booby traps of all sorts. Depending on what intentions they have, T-plus 24 hrs. T- plus 48 hrs. to use these sites as part of air mobile operations, it would also impact the success of a landing force to mass enough forces to take the beaches and destroy the initial defenses.
So, for the first week or so the scale tips towards the defender, who has had several decades to prepare for such scenario. Not being able to secure enough ports, beaches and airports, within the first week could be very costly, since it would not be expected for the US and other allies to be able to respond within the period, trying to exhaust all diplomatic attempts to stop the invasion.
Therefore, when CSIS war-gamed the exercise, they signaled out that if there was no involvement of the US the invasion would succeed if Taiwan fought alone.
Quoting Mark & Matthew Cancian, along with Eric Hegein, as they wrote in their study: “The first Battle of the Next War…”
“…The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads…”.
The wargame was run 24 times, applying different variables, with or without US and Japanese intervention, with or without a blockade, and considering how quickly the US would react or not. They even isolated scenarios to determine the efficiency of the Taiwanese armed forces and the use of certain equipment: (anti-shipping missiles), a blockade prior to an amphibious assault, airborne and air assault operations in support of the invasion.
According to the conclusions reached after all this wargaming, it was essential that Taiwan resisted vigorously. Also, it is required that the US use its bases in Japan and get involved quickly. On the other hand, China would have to use deception techniques to the max, by using RORO (Roll On Roll Off) ships to do vehicle disembarkations where there are no beaches or ports. Use a container ship as a helicopter platform to assist in massing enough forces. Add to that the use of commercial and cargo aircraft for airborne drops, instead of the usual helicopters they use (Harbin Z-20) a dupe of our Sikorsky UH 60 Blackhawk and fixed wing IL 76 variants capable of transporting 240+ paratroopers (2 brigades) and the residual five brigades with other fixed wing (Y20, Y7 Y9) 41-51 paratroopers each. With a total amount of 6-7 airborne brigades numbering an estimated force of 60,000 paratroopers, every viable platform would have to be used to achieve entry within the first few hours.
After evading the multiple mines, traps, and defenses, they would also have to intentionally ground at least some ROLO ferries on beaches to overcome the initial lack of controlled ports. This ruse would help get ashore the supplies and materials. All these deceptive maneuvers are extremely risky and represent heavy losses in personnel, materiel, and equipment. China may conduct feints to draw Taiwanese attention to amphibious landing sites that are not the main effort and could exploit the opportunity and turn a feint into a real attack.
But deception starts even at very early stages of planning, sometimes months, weeks before the event, and in many cases almost impossible to conceal. A key indicator is force build-up. Of which live exercises, natural disasters, and inclement weather may be opportune to cover the movement of units, critical supplies, and other preparations.
Now that China will do at least two major live-fire exercises yearly (the latest pattern for two years ongoing), that would serve as a baseline for planning. Taiwan has also implemented its own wargaming exercises to coincide with these events.
So, as you put the puzzle together, you can clearly isolate other critical indicators and warnings by identifying equipment movement, and in the case of a live fire exercise, the number of missiles and types, and figure out the intent and any changes. Again, these would either serve as a deterrence or a trap.
In the end, a Chinese Amphibious invasion would be, in modern times, the most complicated operation since D Day, even if it can’t amass the total numbers of troops and equipment that were used during D Day. The war game scenarios predict a very high cost of equipment and personnel failing in China in most scenarios. The intervention of the US and Japan in the conflict also reassures this statement. Unless China manages to fool or deceive via numerous ploys, the actual invasion, their chances for success to at least gain a foothold on a southern shore are limited.
The CSIS did not include any elements of deception in their wargaming, testing different conditions, and they also were not capable of achieving the final goal of control. So, the monitoring of these bi-annual exercises becomes crucial to see if and what elements of deception could be used in the event of an attack. The Army and Armed Forces generally train to fight, and rehearse their battles using battle plans, doctrine, and CPX/FTX (command post exercises and field training exercises). So, as you gain knowledge and can verify potential scenarios with deception operations you can include during the wargame to test out outcomes.
President Xi has been in power since 2012 for over 13 years, and he has even amended the constitution so he can remain in power for life. But he is 72 years old, he regained control of Hong Kong and Macao, and will continue to pursue the goal of reunification of Taiwan within the next decade. Some analysts narrow down the bracket to 2027-2030. Within two years, he will be 74, and in 2030, he will be 77 years old. How will his health be? He has claimed this to be part of his legacy to bring Taiwan under one China rule and will not desist.
How will the economy of a country of 1.4 billion people be in 2027? 2030? How solid is the Social Welfare Fund for it to support 300 million Chinese ages 50-60, retiring within the next decade, when they estimate the fund to be defunded by 2035? If today one out of five young adults ages 16-24 can’t find a job, and you have a housing glut of over 2 billion units, of which many are empty in what is called ghost cities, and the internal economy won’t take the place of the export sales lost with a tariff war. Those are elements of dissent in the population that would really have an impact on any decision.
But again, let’s never forget that also in austere and critical times in Argentina, a military junta in 1982 invaded the Falkland Islands. Appealing to Nationalism, sovereignty, when in fact the problems on the mainland were economic, and dealing with discontent and terrorist movements, and the Army’s dealing with the children and families of these terrorists.
Anything can happen despite the internal issues in any given country and leaders will use diversionary tactics to hold back a popular unrest or coup.
Another thing to consider is the US doctrine towards China and the changes since 2021. During the Biden administration funding for regional deterrence tripled to nearly $15 billion dollars (2021-24) The authorization to co-sponsor, build and assign Marines to a base in Northern Australia, the reappearance of naval assets in a joint venture with the Philippines at the old base in Subic Bay apart from other bilateral agreement in the South China Sea seemed to be the focus of attention. In contrast, Xi Jinping has been involved in destabilizing not only the South China Sea but all the way north through the Taiwan Strait onto the coasts of Japan.
Xi has had China participate in a Joint exercise with the Russian Navy around the Kuril Islands (Russia) and the Senkaku Islands (China). Both countries have made claims to them and will continue to test those waters. Xi Xioa Ping has carried the weight of the banking transactions with Russia and dual-use electronic components found in drones and missiles assembled in Russia, so he is committed to many other endeavors in the region and worldwide.
So, Washington’s general deterrence policy should be re-evaluated to an immediate deterrence. China’s recent moves and actions, and by their own admission, clearly stated that the Shandong aircraft carrier was brought in during the latest exercise, to coordinate naval and air operations and evaluate joint operations. A hint of the further integration of all combined operations, a key indicator, and a must-do task to invade.
Sending naval vessels and aircraft towards those grey zones has been intentional to test the Taiwanese reactions. They do believe in a possible scenario where a military exercise could evolve into a sneak attack.
Given the fact that Beijing is constantly sending warplanes into the Taiwan Strait, which is a major international navigation corridor where more than 20% of the global maritime trade traverses yearly, and this is a 2022 statistic. Consider that 44% of the world’s containers fleet transit the Straits. On top of that they tag along any US battleship or from other countries traverse the Straits.
Taiwan in a response to these war games, and findings, has set up a central response group to monitor the latest exercises, according to Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that the exercises were directed at Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s strongly pro-independence president. Polling shows the overwhelming majority of the island’s residents reject the possibility of Chinese rule and back their current state of Taiwan independence.
Taiwan and China split amid civil war 76 years ago, but tensions have risen since 2016, during Barack H. Obama’s administration, when China cut off almost all contacts with Taipei, despite the fact that Taiwanese nationals were the original source of investment in 1991, and since then, over 206 billion dollars’ worth of investments have reached a peak of almost 166 billion in trade in 2023.
Further findings, and results of these studies allude to that Taiwan would have to fight off a Chinese blockade and invasion for around a month before the United States could successfully airlift or sealift forces or munitions to support it, according to war games organized by a defense industrial base simulation carried out by the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank.
As a final thought, just keep these comments to arrive at your conclusion:
At a briefing explaining the exercise, CSIS defense expert Mark Cancian said “…Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and two relatively narrow coastal strips make it “a difficult island to capture….” Aside from its terrain, Taiwan’s capital, along with most of its industry and military forces, are in the north, he said, adding that this presents China with “a tough choice.”
China can either invade in the north, “into the teeth of the Taiwanese defenses” but also very close to Taipei, or in the south, where it is much easier to get a shore, but “you have to fight your way up the entire island If Chinese forces did gain a foothold in the south, the resulting campaign would look like Italy in the Second World War, with Chinese and Taiwanese troops fighting “river line by river line, ridge line by ridge line,” he said.
In the event of an attack on the south, he said, China would try to get its forces ashore and quickly capture a port or airfield, while the U.S. and Japan would race to sink Chinese amphibious ships, so they could no longer support their forces in Taiwan.
Yet another war game was also hosted by CSIS with the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party in November 2024.
The same analyst reiterated that, “…In most of the [simulations] we won that race, but at a very high cost, …” Cancian said.
During this session, Cancian highlighted that “… one lesson of the war game was the value of anti-ship missiles…” In the next couple of years, “I think the most effective thing you could do is to give Taiwan 500 Harpoon missiles,” he said. Such missiles would be stationed in Taiwan, put on mobile launchers, and able to hit Chinese ships within range, without having to put U.S. troops on the ground, he said.
“The other lesson is that once the fighting begins, it’s impossible to get any forces or reinforcements onto Taiwan,” Cancian said. Because Chinese forces would surround Taiwan, the U.S. would not be able to get an airlift or sealift to the island “at least for the first three or four weeks,” he said.
For that reason, “Taiwan would have to fight at least the first month, and maybe the first two months, with whatever it starts out with.”
To conclude, an amphibious invasion would be what China is preparing for, based on the exercises and recent movement of resources probing continuously those Grey areas around Taiwan.
If it happens, elements of deception would be critical and planned well ahead of time, disguised as this current series of exercises. A great many indicators and warnings would alert Taiwan, the US, and its allies, given the complexity of the operation, the short distances between both countries, the impact on maritime operations affecting worldwide shipping, and many other factors. The way it may start could be a blockade, a quarantine based on an excuse or accusation. Holding Coast Guard vessels, boarding commercial shipping, and accusing Taiwan of sabotage operations. That would quickly escalate to an invasion.
The defender has the upper hand during the commencement of hostilities, given the amount of preparation, defenses, natural terrain, and inaccessibility to landing sites. So even if you combine an amphibious assault with airborne operations, it would be a colossal endeavor.
And China does not have the number of airborne troops carriers that were used in D-Day so a need to activate cargo airplanes and commercial aircraft would also signal to an impending airborne assault.
Deception is key, but with the requirements to achieve a violent and insurmountable assault that could achieve control of airports, beachheads, and continue to send additional troops and equipment, requiring them to do artificial ports, seems very difficult.
This is reflected in the wargaming brainstorming scenarios. So, will it ever get to an assault? Or could it be a blockade, quarantine? Your call is as good as mine…
References
AP World News. (2025, April 2). China conducts military drills focusing on Taiwan Strait. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/china-military-drills-taiwan-strait-shipping-5a8897368bdabc7038c170bf5b20a7f6
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (n.d.). Defeating deception: Outthinking Chinese deception in a Taiwan invasion (Part 1 of the China Power Series). https://chinapower.csis.org/
Easton, I. (2021, May 26). Why a Taiwan invasion would look nothing like D-Day. The Diplomat. Project 2049 Institute. https://project2049.net/2021/05/26/why-a-taiwan-invasion-would-look-nothing-like-d-day/
Focus Taiwan CAN English News. (2024, November 21). Taiwan must hold out one month if China invades: U.S. war game. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202411210008
Independent. (2024, October 14). China encircles Taiwan in latest round of war games to warn ‘separatist forces’. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/china-encircles-taiwan-military-drills-independence-b2628708.html
Straight Arrow News. (2025, February 26). Taiwan scrambles forces as China stages provocative ‘live-fire’ war games. https://san.com/cc/taiwan-scrambles-forces-as-china-stages-provocative-live-fire-war-games/
The Defense Post. (2025, March 20). Taiwan’s annual war games to simulate 2027 China attack. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/03/20/taiwan-china-attack/
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).