04 Jan Opinion – The World’s Dilemma at the End of 2025: Between Multipolarity and Unipolarity
By,
Leonardo Quijarro Santibáñez, RAdm, Chilean Navy (Ret.), Guest Senior Analyst, MSI²
The end of 2025 presents itself before history as what may be the epilogue of the era of undisputed hegemony and the preface to a fragmented global order. What we have witnessed in the final days of December is not merely a succession of alarming news stories but the manifestation of competition among great powers that has transcended traditional diplomatic channels to express itself through kinetic and asymmetric conflicts on a global scale. We stand at an inflection point in which the international system is torn between the persistence of transactional unilateralism and the emergence of competitive multipolarity.
This dilemma becomes painfully evident on the steppes of Eastern Europe. The Eurasian front, now heading into its fourth year of war, experienced a significant escalation in the final days of 2025. Russia’s massive attack on December 28, employing an arsenal of nearly 520 drones and 40 precision missiles against Kyiv’s energy infrastructure, was not an isolated military act. Rather, it functioned as a tool of “fire diplomacy.” The operation was strategically executed hours before a high-level meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump, sending a clear message that Moscow will accept only a peace that recognizes its territorial annexations.
From the perspective of structural realism, this scenario confirms that power is the means by which survival is guaranteed in an anarchic system. Citing University of Chicago political science professor John Mearsheimer, the world today is organized around three major centers: the United States, China, and Russia. These three major actors in global geopolitics remain in a condition of permanent conflict, eliminating the possibility of lasting stability in the absence of a new grand global bargain. Ukraine’s response on December 29, striking Russian infrastructure affecting crude oil production in Kazakhstan, demonstrates that the current form of multipolarity is deeply disruptive, capable of generating massive collateral damage in global energy markets and to Western corporate interests.
Meanwhile, in the Pacific, China’s “Justice Mission 2025” operation launched on December 29 has placed the world on edge. This simulated total blockade of Taiwan seeks not only to deter the island’s independence but also to establish “external deterrence” against the United States and its allies. The potential involvement of Japan suggests that the Taiwan Strait is now the epicenter of the dispute between a regional order led by the U.S. alliance system and China’s vision of undisputed continental hegemony. Here, security is perceived not merely as an accumulation of power, but as a social construction based on collective identities and cultures that collide head-on.
Within this maelstrom, the United States has responded with a radical turn toward the “Golden Fleet.” The announcement of the USS Defiant, a 40,000-ton “Trump”-class battleship equipped with nuclear weapons and lasers, marks a return to a doctrine of overwhelming force aimed at deterring any potential adversary. This posture was demonstrated on Christmas Day with unilateral strikes in Nigeria against ISIS-Sahel cells. Although justified under the banner of counterterrorism, these acts of unilateralism underscore Washington’s unique technological capacity, while also exacerbating local tensions by at times disregarding national sovereignty in states with weaker institutional frameworks, such as those in the Sahel.
This contrast reveals a structural crisis of multilateralism. The United Nations faces a state of “systemic exhaustion,” as the routine use of the veto has blocked critical resolutions. We are witnessing a de-Westernization of the global order, accompanied by a perceived double normative standard: compliance with international law is demanded in some places while ignored in others. From the perspective of critical security studies, true security should seek the emancipation of individuals from poverty and oppression, not merely the preservation of state power. Yet the reality of 2025 shows that the state remains the primary provider of security, even though its methods are often “zero-sum” in nature.
On the other hand, when we examine smaller-scale conflicts, such as the border confrontation between Thailand and Cambodia, we observe the collapse of effective arbitration. Neither pressure from Washington nor from Beijing succeeded in sustaining a ceasefire for more than 24 hours, demonstrating that in a multipolar world, regional actors enjoy greater latitude to challenge superpowers when their national interests are at stake. The paralysis of ASEAN and the UN leaves a vacuum that military force desperately attempts to fill.
The dilemma of multipolarity in 2025 lies in its lack of crisis-management mechanisms. Unlike the Cold War, the proliferation of drones, hypersonic weapons, and artificial intelligence has shortened reaction times, increasing the risk of catastrophic miscalculations. Competition among great powers often turns fragile states into pieces on the global chessboard.
In conclusion, the year 2025 leaves us with a stark warning: the survival of a functional global civilization will not depend on who wins the battle for hegemony, but on whether we are capable of recognizing that the challenges of the 21st century, such as AI regulation or climate change, cannot be resolved through nationalist retrenchment or the imposition of force. As the world vacillates between nostalgia for a unipolar order that no longer exists and the uncertainty of a fragmented multipolarity, it appears to have chosen conflict as its only language.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute (MSI²).